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b 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID M. STAUFFER and CONNIE A. 
STAUFFER, 
vs' 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
and Cross Respondents, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and ) 
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION, ) 
) 
Defendants and Respondents ) 
and Cross Appellants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
Case No. 15468 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND CROSS APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellants brought this action seeking specific perform-
ance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Barring the contract's 
enforceability, Appellants sought recovery of money paid under 
the contract and compensation for improvements made. 
Respondents answered claiming there was no enforceable 
agreement between the parties and counterclaimed for the reasonable 
rental value of the premises occupied by Appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court found the contract unenforceable and 
denied specific performance thereof. Appellants were allowed 
recovery, however, for money paid under the contract, with 
interest, said sum being reduced to judgment. During the trial, 
Appellants voluntarily dismissed with prejudice their claim for 
value of improvements. Conversely, Respondents' claim for the 
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rental value of the premises during their occupancy by App 11 e ants 
was disallowed, despite a preferred stipulation as to their 
value,.!/ and over Respondents-Cross Appellants' vigorous objectio~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment as to 
the findings and conclusions pertaining to the unenforceability 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract on the ground that the trial 
court made no error of fact or law. 
Respondents have cross appealed, and seek reversal of 
the denial of their claim for damages in the amount of the rental 
value of the property offsetting the amounts paid under the contra'. 
on the ground that the denial was contrary to established law 
and precedent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Respondents believe that Appellants' statement 
of the facts is both discordant to the transcript and the trial 
court's findings below, Respondents will, pursuant to Rule 75(p)(i 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, state the facts as properly foood 
by the trial court, and as amply supported by the record. 
In 1959 Respondents Russell and Velma G_~J.1, r:e.sidents 
-
._ .............. _~~ 
of California, purchased approximatelz 400 acres of property in 
..--~·Jo< ~,.,,___,._._..:;,._.;itn.,._,.,,..;,,..,._,, .. •-+1-n,.;.,.··'·•···•''~"\!.~~~k-\"''·1.""'-r'"'-'-'•'-~•.'··'•~ . .,.~.,- .. .-~."·''fr' .,J' '·· 
Washington County in an area generally known as Anderson Junction . 
............. ~--~"' ....... '""''""'~·"' . ..,-,'-.. ·· __ __._.._, __ .. _ ··-~-.. ---~-·~··-. 
On the land they purchased were located two houses, the ~~r~~r 
constructed of rock, the smaller ~~~"~·~"·T~:· ~urrounding land 
-·~---~'-"· ······-·-· 
---~-····~·-'·'" ~~-~--~·-" .. ' .... • . h 
has many fences on it, and much has been used for farming, wit 
s;~;--~~v~~~,,·~-e;~···;et aside for orchards. Y Irrigation of all 
the land was supplied primarily from a single well. 
-2-
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Stauffers View Property 
In the spring of 1968, the Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
,,.J---~-J -· «' - ... ,;-._ ·~~ 
1~. ~Ir. and Mrs. Stauffer, residents of California, fi,:~~c.,.X_i~~}::~~>~?e 
A;de;son Junction ar;a while vacationing in Utah. At that time 
th~Y v-iewed the Anderson Junction area only as one of several 
"parcels"; no fences were measured, no distances were stepped 
off, in fact nothing was ~~oJ:le __ to de_te~~.11-~ t~-~ _b,o_~_da.r.~~~'"c:>.L~~y 
particular_P.ar_cel. The s::~:.:::=~-~:r::z • .::::~~~--};.h~e,,"~~§~~-~?'s, 
w~lked around the property and looked at the area in general. 
rran-s~ript of Court Proceedings (hereinafter T) 5 7: 28-30; 100: 
23-25. There were no tenants on the property at the time. 
r 224: 23-25; 258: 10-17. Subsequently, the Stauffers contacted 
~ltf·-<»V.~J.:..·-· .......... ,_.,_;_·~n..!,,, 
Mr. Call and expressed an interest in the property. T 224:19-21; 
258:3-9. Thereafter, but still in 1968, Mr. Call visited the 
Stauffers at their home in West Covina, California. T 17:29-18:6; 
59:23-29; 224:ll-24. In the brief evening dicussion of 15 to 20 
' minutes, the possibility of renting or selling the homes was 
discussed. T 18:9; 19:27; 226:17-19. 
Mr. Stauffer came to Utah to see the property over 
.,.,, :··".,.,,,..·"'· '· '_.1.-.-:· .. _ 1_.r.-~··--< ~r.,, 
Christmas, 1968.H;-t.<l;~-;~,-~,li.'-o~~~"~he area and looked at as 
much as [he] could of the property", again only getting a 
general idea of the lay of the land. T 20: ll-14. Nothing else 
was done. Upon his return to California, he arranged to meet 
with the Calls again. 
January 2, 1969 
On Saturday, January 2, 1969, between 10 o'clock and 
11 o' 1 k . . c oc in the morm.ng the parties met at the Call home in 
_,"' ........... ..-·t '"''°: ... _ )....._, ..... ~ """' ,,,, ..... ,,.,.--..""""" ... .,"'"""' ···~n 
-3-
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Santa Maria, California. T 22:20-21; 227:7-18, 26-30. In the 
words of Mr. Call, 
Mr. Stauffer said that on the night previous 
he had sit [sic] down and put on paper what 
we had discussed on the telephone. And he 
said, 'would I read it, and if I agreed to it 
sign it.' T 229:12-17. ' 
Mr. Call, however, did not feel that Stauffer's notations of th, 
telephone conversation reflected Call's understanding. 
stating; 
So I read it, and I didn't read it all. I got 
about quite a ways into it, and it said, 'that 
t-~~--~-;~i:He::,s .\17.Q,\,l,i~t P1;1+cba..s~ ... th~' well, the wel,i 
wate; i.:?::gtl!=.~. ,a,i:i..c\~~h~_ . .J,.,q~g1: t.J.Oll . wat~r rignH. ~ 
An'Crmlen, 'I_.,£§,1:!\~,J:..Q, .~_Mt;: p,QJ.JJ.,t;, I said that 'We 
ha'd-Sp~~ci_!:;.~_alJY .. eJr.qi~ded .. the water rights and 
r"mn6f:--Interested in the sale . . . ' T 229: 
I~.......... . . 
The Stauffers then withdrew for lunch, Mr. Stauffer 
We've come all the way to transact some kind of 
purchase from you, it is lunch time, we are going 
to lunch and we would like to drop back after lunch. 
Mrs. Stauffer has her typewriter with her and these 
things can be negotiated. T 229:28-230:2. 
As the parties gathered that afternoon, Mr. Call 
indicated he would be willing to sell one or both o~ E.,g~ -~o'.11es 
_ ...... .....,~'·''....,,.,,,_:.h•'•--.>•":.,....,,,";i'L"''-.... .,.., .... "'"'' ·o· ·-~~ ·--'' ·.·,--"'''' • ·''"'' '~''•.':"'" 'r~· ''' ,,., ··-·~-~~ ... ·~ 
for a price of four or eight thousand d_ollars _ res;pes~i.V!!_ly. 
___ _,_,...,_..,, __ .,,~-.:t~~-.. --.. _.J.l"ol!:,.~~;...,_ -.. ~. -~·"· lt.··,i-,-~''·<-;.~ ...... ,,, ...... ~,.·.~ .. -·•-":·_,.,, ~- .,., ··- ~· .. ~ . 
T 230: 21-24. The Stauffers, while interested in the two homes, 
wanted more land and water. 
Mr. Stauffer said that he was interested in the 
two homes, but that they had a large family, they 
needed area for a garden, which was the ten acres 
discussed; and Mrs. Stauffer said, 'We need--' I 
remember Mrs. Stauffer saying this one, specifically 
she said, 'I want to have a stream flowing through 
the property.' And Mrs. Stauffer said, 'We need 
some water for irrigation.' T 233:3-9. 
-4-
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t:r. call_~~~t~-~ _to -~e:E.t~: ~Cl..~':~ .. i.l;i_o~_eye,i;:,1 
t\nd constantly during the conversatio1;1, Ihad 
~tres~"that' ''I ~O'u_l.Q.' not ·~·fin Hie 'farm ancf'I was 
reTtic'tant t'o sell any watei:, .b.Jie'~e'fi,ey··aid prev<i_!l, 
anli ultimately ! _said, . 'on .th.e tc:>ta_l stream, I 
will retain two-fift}:is ,of the wat~r, ~- _C.oµipl,ete 
two-fifths of tne wa_f~r :~ . l said, - ''the remaining 
water, I don't know exactly how it is divided up, 
but we have approximately three-fifths of the total 
stream.' T 233:10-16. 
Mr. call succeeded in ~e~J>~~.€i.1:1,~-~.~t-~E?.J:'1Pd. 
___ .... -.,_....,..,,. --· _., _,.-> _,,. '" ' 
So this was the specific of the contract. We did 
have a lot of land. We had more land than we had 
water. But we were specific that I was to have--
retain the farm, and I said 'That I will retain 
the farm ground . . . •"' 1'''2~'3'-:'~'t'::~S"'.'·r<··"'"-"'""'"""'" 
The Stauffers spoke of placing $2,000 down, and Mr. 
Call remarked that with such a small down payment they would not 
~~..,,,...--!>'.,,, .. 1."-..,"'-""Y-;..._·,-~.,. ,,,,.~·~r-.'t-...~""~"''''":-.">~~;.••c.;:.•"~ ,.,,, o:~ ,,,_ ~ ._"~..:.'l~'..Ad' 
Mr. Stauffer did in fact hold an inactive real estate agent's 
...._..__,,..___.._ •. h._.,~·'· -- -••'· .~ - ",-, - .,., ' -.-.• -: ·_ ·.; ...... """°''.h ••. •'!jv"'-·•' "·' .,.;...,->!_ .. ~.~ .. ~~l'. -- '>1·,,;·~.,~., .;,1.~,J, ... ;. ':.1;:;~,.~?"~,.···..,~-'""~';,·.;;.,...--:1< 
license and had taken training and passed testing in real 
estate matters. He had two years' experience selling real 
estate. T 17:6-12; 75:29-76:ll. By contrast, Mr. Call was a 
~-"~,.-~~......_""""'lt .... J'!!'Mi 
pharmacist. T 66:27-30. Mr. Stauffer had obtained blank forms 
_,........._. __ .,,,_.., < '·~ - ' ~,.;, ... ,,;,.~""·'-..'''·· ,,.,~.'.<:·:-o!·;"\•~:·'·'"':·:..·1•.;.;., ... .,_,:_.,,,,, 
of the Uniform Real Estate Contract while in Utah (T 22:29-23:4), 
------.,-..._ ........ i.. .. ~--·~...- •• -~...::..i. •••• ~_, ........... o.1,-,._, ...... .._.,.,o...: ..... ,.~ ..... --·······-... ,.,,, ... ,.: 
and apparently at this point he brought out the forms, and Mrs. 
Stauffer brought out her type~l~;~.": "~~:·~~- ,~~:~:;':onvenient ly 
br~~h~ with her. , , .. ,-,, .. _ ,.f,,.,, .. ,~ .. '"''·" 
The Land Description 
The completed contract appears as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
-5-
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17, and is attached as an appendix to this brief. The con-
veyancing clause of the contract states as follows: 
2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consider 1. herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to buyer an~ i;•. 
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees' to tn, 
purchaae the fol lowing described real property, situate · 
the eounty of Washington , State of Utah, to-wit: in 
Anderson's Junction More particularly deecribeda 
follows: SEE enclosed legal description. Stauffer's to 8 
purchase two houses using the natural bounderies [sic] 
which is approximately 10 acres collectively PLUS appr~s­
mately [sic] 1/5 water rights. 
Call' s to retain the fenced natural farm ground on the SE 
(south side from Interstate Freeway) which is approximately 
40 acres PLUS 2/ 5 water rights. The remaining ground SE of 
the old highway to be Stauffer's along with the two houses. 
Stauffer's to purchase 1/2 of all remainin? property to be 
owned as tenents [sic] in common with Call s. 
The legal description referred to was a description of all of 
-----~··_..,.,_.,.,, • ....,...,,.,,..~.-•...-r.'l~;·""'·~'·,.,,,;_,, .• "'''"•'-""~·-'""~'•·~•·~··V ... ,,._,,<.>.'- ··- •·'··· "•'!. ' ' 
Mr. Gall's property located in the Anderson Junction area. 
----·---W~"""'""""'•",...,,rj.'.·U'?'''<,'" .. •, ~-·, -•,,.,''•'·'·"' •:· '•'• •'" :·" . ,.,•r,·, .• •'' •' '" ',. "• 
descriptions would not aid in defining property subject to the 
--~-----~··~~-1\folP.:""'~"-~""~d.<\"tk:i:e.~·;'4:::~1~-..· •. ·';:rl,; . .,.,........., -_,..._,> ,.. • '-.--·- · - .. - ,,.,,, .. (".1-- ,., .... _ . ....,.\! 
contract, but were just a general description of all the property 
__ .. -... '- >C '• l• ........ d ...... ,., ....... .-. .... ,.,,ll'J.,.,~~"''·A~~·V•',''''·--'_,·,,,~V<.,,'•~·"'O"•.••'I'-•·' ''' '<' ' -., .. , '·••, ·~•-<O!o 
Mr. Call owned. T 64:30-65:14, especially T 65:7-14. While each 
.-----~·~ 
of the Stauffers initially contended on direct examination that 
the above contractual language was supplied solely by Mr. Call 
(T 25:6; 101:29-102:1), it stretches credulity to believe t_hi~.· 
~_,,....._.~v>ll'>lt.4•P•·1 ·'...-.;,..,_,.,,.,,,./' .\~·;··_.~,..~· •'c- ... •-L,.,'::«',~· • 
Indeed, in light of Gall's unfamiliarity (and Mr. Stauffer's 
familiarity) with the terms of art used (See T 66:27-67:2), 
and in light of the fact that Mrs. Stauffer typed the contract 
on forms supplied by Mr. Stauffer (T 25:10; 101:23-28), ~ 
Appellants' belated concessions ~I1:,.c~~s_s examinat~_<?n. -~~!1-t ,t~ey 
--...-............. ,,,.,.,,,~ •• ., .. 111t-,~ .... 1"''"" ......... ~, .. l\J.,.J.....r""'•"r.•""'.-·,~:v .. -··c~ .,._ .. ~·· .,, • , tB 
had been actively involved in preparing the contrac.~_ cigp _in 1 
t~i;;~l~·gy--;;;~··-h;;d.i; ~:~~e~~~~)j'' .. Clearly, the conv~~ancing 
~r;l[f'.f.I.<, ·•• ~ 
... _ ... ,, .. -' 
-6-
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had been supplied by Appellants. See Footnote 3. language 
Ultimately, the tentative and indefinite language used 
expressive of the fact that the elements of the contract, was 
including the land description, were still subject to negotiation. 
Significant is the explicit use of infinitives, Stauffers to 
~rchase and Calls to sell and convey and to retain, which usage 
further evinces the precatory intent of the parties. Further, 
Mrs. Stauffer understood and testified that the boundaries of the 
ho;;; were still subject to negotiation. T 81:7-9; 82:27-29. 
As Mrs. Stauffer stated, "We agreed to agree, because we were 
trying to get along." T 170:14-15. See also T 170:1-30. It was 
Mr. Gall's understanding, as well, that he would have to come to 
Utah to work out the boundaries. See Finding No. 5; T 244:15-22; 
266:10. And, as the boundaries of the property attendant to the 
sale of the homes remained uncertain, the balance of the property 
description implicitly remained equally nebulous. The events of 
' ~,-,.:<'.JI 
that day were simply a preliminary agreement to show good faith 
,•~r'',"'~ '°><~.·:·~ 
intentions. T 266:17-21. 
The reason for tentative agreement was obvious. The 
parties were more than 400 miles away from the property and were 
uncertain as to both the location of objects and directions. 
Mr. Stauffer testified that he had some sketches of the land 
(T 60:4-10), and Mr. Call remembered the Stauffers having some 
sort of a map (T 235: 8-13), but neither party was clear as to 
the topography. Mr. Call even testified they determined the 
' ., .... . .. ·.~...:: ...... 
i~t~rstate highway :-;hi~h.· ~~~':1al~~ run_s_, n,o,~~ll,"~!ld_ s?u~~ ~ .. ~~~ 
east and west since it went between Utah and California. 
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T 235: 24-236: 14. Thus, by setting out the land des.cr~P.~.ions in 
.....__,_,,__..~-.......,._-r·-•''·'·'· .. ......,."""""·· 
general terms, the parties agree~ ... ~~-1~ to agree on '.'I general 
, ,. '·""""';.,, •..::. ...... .:,-·' -~,~-' \.• · .. -· '" ,,.; '"•." -"- '-~ ·,. '· ·-, 
framework for the c°'r_it.ernplat.ed sale .. without committing themselves 
-~"°""'WI'> 
to the amount and boundaries of the land sold. 
The Two Hornes 
Stauffers, by the terms of the agreement, were "to pur· 
- --...... 
chase two houses, using the natural bounderies, sic] which is 
_,,..., ... """~ ..... -~r;.,..,,...-1 ... "<-<~.,-,,..,,1.;!f ....... ~h·,,·,.,~.-- -.~J~. ·-·-~ ; ••. , ' ,.,,, ,, :--- -·-· ·'· ·. _.,, 
approximately 10 acres collectively .... " The Stauffers 
---~--"~/ooOt\-""'°'.-..''''~r"'fl""""'•'b'·-1.•'1..u.~·~·-......,,·"-i?-.t···•'....".•·' >·-1··1 ...... ,,,)~ 
generally asserted that natural boundaries meant fences (T 30:14 
----~----~~~~.,._. ... ,._,.....,._,~.,._.,_~_.,.,,.:..,.,, .. ;.r.;;.•.,,..,_ . ....,..,..,."1"4;,~,,-,.,_._ •· ,, . .j I 
6 7: 3-5), and all parties conceded that the "approximately 10 acrn 
.--------~----"'""'.:<;.\';r_,~t'"'--'"''·-~ ... :•.'~-~·'-·· . 
collectively" could have been cornpr;~e£ of any combination of 
~~4'.,'.;.'""'"";to\fl' .. "<;,.;•,-,, • ..;\,,-,._..,.: .... ~..,,.'.-ll;.:>(;;,~<;,,.•.;1·0~····-.~·-.:·~··--" '•<-• ·1l.,,"·".··.· '".• ,,.. •-:_··,,,:.,:."•.• ' ''·••:o-.,·--·• .. 
acres around each house. T 65:26-66:7; 147:29-148:8; 274:22-2/l:! 
~-·"'""""~~i'..M• ....... \it:rfl-~Rl"''";:,,,~~·~:·,\°4'f'"''·""'\'. 
Mr. Call was unequivocal in stating that in the January meetingm 
agreement was reached as to the boundaries around each home. 
T 242: 24-243: 3. He stated, "I don't believe any of the parties 
involved knew where the fences ran." T 243:13-15. At trial, 
Mrs. Stauffer repeatedly admitted that her surveyor failed to 
follow established fence lines, often simply rationalizing that 
where her surveyor's description failed to follow a fence, the 
"fence" noted on the map ceased to be a fence for boundary purpw 
T 143:17-24. 
Farm Ground 
Mr. Call was specifically to retain approximately .~o 
.,-,, ~O:~'"t-~ . , .... -
_.,.,..._;_-..;_. .... -~ . ...,.,._-.. ,,.,....._.~-:-... · ,. '·•c·,·.,_;._·,..,.:,.-,," ~·--
acres described as "the fenced natural . farm ground." Mr 
________ .....__>.ill•'~_"J.::.;»,.,..,i•,:.;&.'.;;.o"·,...,,.':..::~.,,.._,.,~~·,41'•,.,.._,.j',\..;l.~;·, ... _., ..... Y':,\..1,•'·"·"·""~,' .-__ .,f<~·,· ', <'•"!'I-";.-~,.,-,,. 
Stauffer testified that even at trial in 1977, he was unsure 
what ground had been farmed and what had not. T 61:12-62:S. 
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Tenancy in Common 
The remainder of the land was to be held by the 
f and the Calls as tenants in common. Stauf ers And, again, as 
the explicit part to be sold to Stauffers could not be deter-
mined, so also "the remainder" remained without determination. 
Negotiation of Boundaries 
The parties agreed to get together in the spring of 
.... ,.. ...... ' 
1969 to work out the boundari,es. T 244:8-22. Though Mr. Call 
____...-~<v 
didn~~--expect the Stauffers to move onto the land until the 
~,_ ... -.-:.:.-·-·--· '-~-·--- .•• _..,,,., ·-·~,--• ,.••.. ,,_,, ••• '·' _· ...... :. •.• ,,, ,_.,_,-1c_, __ _,, ·--:--,....,.·;..~-· -,~-,...-..., ... --'· ·- ,, •• ,-~--- --·(f:.,.-;.,-,.., .... -.1 
terms were settled (T 266: 7-14), Stauffers occupied the small 
-~,_,,,.,.u.-·--· • '.V/·-·'• ., •. ;..'<., ..•• ."{':),, '-"'-'t··r_ ·" -'~ . ,,,_.;·o1 'I• •.I."' r)> \ <, --•r• ,.,..,,;:J~<l•,·., >>-.:..'·. '• ••·"'i'\•"'•'.:.'>",'>~.J '-rJ'.~·, ;.> :.~.,.-,r"/:!."'<~'11.1.-·•-.:•,,:.,'~:i;.;: 
~ in the spring of 1969_; See Finding No. 5. Mr. Call made 
..• - •. •I- ~~ .• ,..,-...-vl-'.........: ...... - ...~llr.)of 
_.. .. -----
several trips to Utah attempting to reach a final agreement. He 
, , ,. c,_,....·r ;.' • .,i..'" ~·-~" ,_, •t. ;, . ,;~·-~ .. v , ,._ ""· .,J.,,,,. .. ..,,1 -. ·~'-::,:•:,1,.,..,;-..r~ ,,-~,....'· testrfi~d 'to-~~,ki~g~- ~·i;--~~ips to the property and spending 21 
4,~-,,o.-:~"':c>"·· ~r ... ~-~--...;;.:?".A'· 
days in St. _G~?:t:'&,e moE._~J::.~,.:i.I.1~Jj_~_2· T 245:17-20.f±..I Though nego-
tiations continued, no agreement was reached on the boundaries 
-c·..-.-·, . ...,~..,...~ r • .:I';.-: ,....,.";°".;'."""'""·' _.,,~,,.(,' _.!f;,i.,;..t(,,,.,e~-""-·l~.-,."':.~. ··~--.,;.J:"L...,l,~1';,; . ..,.:;}•~~-!>~ 1~~o/.:.,-i<.._,-.,.. 1:,,.1._,...,..;;:;:;.:~ 
in1969 (T 250:15-20) or in later years (T 250:23-29; 252:2-ll). 
The Court specifically found that these discussions took place, 
but that no agreement was reached.2./ 
Stauffer Survey 
The St~~ad_ .. ::.!~:!:Z.,~~ ... ~~~~~!fllt 
and attem~.:;_:t_~2 __ ~1;1;£.~I,, t1,E.:....-£~!l .. ~,~,.-~~:!~..2-..tJ?x .. ~~~."'!!j.m 
a set of deeds, without_ an<·-~,q~c:>.1~R~!l-Z~llA.,Rl!.l!-..,;l~~,a~ ..... Sh.!E.nvhe 
--·~"'"---'' ·-··'-•·.._, .. ,. :.~, ..... ,,..,,,_,..,.,..i,•.: _,,. .. _..,....,,_,,., •• ' 
execute the deeds. See Exhibits C and D attached to Complaint, 
Rl6 et. seq. When a friend of Mr. Call, a civil engineer, had 
drawn out the legal descriptions so that Mr. Call could see what 
iliey described, he refused to execute the deeds. T 254:15-18. 
I ,:-· -:r::"'J; •rt.•.'l.;~-.J,>f:Vh~,,·-·W"'"~-...""1-'t.Wfh•i~.t':Q-IY!f. .• ..._'(,•~.<#,t~' 
The source of the directions given the surveyor was always 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assumed to be Mrs. Stauffer, acting alone. However, Mrs. St f 
auJ;: 
testified at trial that the survey was made according to mark 
ers 
placed by herself and Mr. Call. She said 
He [Mr. Call] came to the house and said, 'Let's 
make sure we agree on all these things before 
the survey.' T 105:9-11. 
She then described what had never been mentioned in discovery 
,_,J;i7··.;:.. 0 ~·.:.;l-....,.i.-~•· ·'"'"""''"·''"""""'·~ •,.., · ",'' 
or depositions; an excursion around ~he property, over two 
hours long, walking and placing litt,le piles of rocks. T 106: 
30-ll7: 1. According to Mrs. Stauffer, this was the time the 
boundaries were defined exactly. T ll0:9-10; 132:12-13; 133: 
2-134:3. And according to her testimony at trial, all the 
boundaries were clear after this walk. She was, however, unable 
_ .. _.,. ..... 
to explain the inconsistency between her testimony at trial and 
.. - ... 
T 158:19-27. And she did admit that some 
boilllciari.e~··;er~"set arbitrarily by the surveyor. T 112:7-9; l3l 
22-136; 5. Conversely, Mr. Call categorically and emphatically 
'... ' " • • v ,. "'~· ' '> ,,_, J. ~ '..JI 
denied such a field trip. T 252:20-27; 252:28-253:5; 253:30.ZSt 
The court specifically found that Mrs. Stauffer's testimony not 
•.:~., ., ·'· "" •', '""".""''".,··,. ,rr _,, ·,. ·•·t~)I •, •• 
credible when it found that no agreement was ever reached 
"r, •• v,~~·,,,.\.;~··'. _ . ., '· ·,.- ,· ~. •-., .. L ,_., ~,:.--,,,. -~c ,..., 1 .... •.•.·-,• '','' -,., ··•~ 
res~r.;;i;g,~th;0 ~biguous land descriptions. Finding No. 7 · 
··-w-~ .. --, '" Th~ pr'i~~-i~al'';~,~~{~~--~~~~ ;~~- .Stauffers' survey was, 
of course, that it was a unilateral proposition and not amicably 
settled and mutually satisfactory as contemplated in 1969. The 
second problem is actually a function of the first - the survey, 
in being merely a platting of the Stauffers' self-interest, 
''r. fails to conform to the general framework set forth in the Un1•0 · 
Real Estate Contract. Ultimately, the survey allegedly reflecte: 
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the 197 2 boundary excursion testimony, which, even were that 
Credible, nonetheless, is but an embodiment of otherwise story 
inadmissible and incompetent parol evidence. See Davison v. 
~· 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). 
Examination of the survey reveals that few of the 
boundaries of the platted parcels are set on fence lines, which 
the Stauffers claimed were the natural boundaries referred to in 
the contract. Around the small house, not one of the boundaries 
of the parcel (parcel 1) completely follows a fence. Only three-
----~-
quarters of one boundary follows a fence at all. Both the 
_____.,....-~ .. - ·~~,,.,.,,_,, ___ ,~_-." ·" --•·''·~,.,..,-.'*'f~.~>"•, ... .,-... ~ .. ~·-•,• ,~ .. >(.'.l_....,._.~,.,·;:.-<'.""'•7><"-.,...,·-r"•ol;'-'.t;'.;~~.t • .,<:.-r., '·-" · · . ...,," 
Stauffers conceded, and their survey shows, several fences which 
could form natural boundaries. T 70: 17-71: l; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
18;Tl44:15-17; 145:14-146:6; Defendants' Exhibit 2. None of 
these, however, were used in the survey to define the parcels 
surrounding the lit t 1 e house . 
The parcel adjacent to the small house (parcel 2-A) 
has only one boundary which is a fence. Mr. Stauffer recognized 
this, and further stated that many parts of the boundary had 
never been discussed. T 73:9-28. 
The land around the large house (parcel 3) was also 
.. •"' ·-'~•L•• ,-,..,< .-··~~.a~.>.,q.;.,.,,.,.._,,..,,.,,.,_,.....,~.......,,,.. .• ,,~,,,::;: .... ~.,.:.,.,,,,.,..., .......... ;/l:.:...C~-0.~_,,J.l/l~(';:f.i,l>trit:::'!h_,..,~"'..l..\C,,;".'"-?f 
arbitrarily designated. One of its boundaries follows a fence, 
,__ _ ....... --~_.._,~......_-.......,'-"""''"'~-"-
but several of the boundaries were admittedly placed by the 
'-•· ''°"•'' .J·-.-.., ."'~-·->.-....,.,.,-.,~-«"''<1'':' ·'---W'"'~ ~, .. ,._-,,.,~ .. ,~·'!-r;.,•l;J) ~:;;:~ ••. 0(t'; o•>i•'- .,.,.~;,: ~~·->:.' ;j.,.P.-\_:;.,i>;.,~' 
surveyor. T 82: 4-15. 
The most severe deficiency of the survey was in the 
amount of land the Stauffers would allow Mr. Call to retain. 
According to Stauffers, "fenced natural farm ground 
approximately 40 acres'' meant the parcel designated on their 
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survey as parcel 4. While it is fenced, and while it is farm 
ground, the parcel contains only 18 acres, as the survey shells. 
Stauffers admit there is a larger perimeter fence, enclosing 
farm land (including that designated as parcel 4) which has 
been shown to contain about 46 acres, but they deny that this 
is the land referred to in the contract as being retained by 
Mr. Call. T 92:8-28; 98:11-16. 
Call Survey 
Mr. Call then subsequently connnissioned a survey 
reflecting his surveyo~~'.s. ~e~s·t interpretation of what each pa:t: 
__ .... --'...._...,,,,, .. .,. , .. _._ 
should have. See Defendants' Exhibit 3. The survey is subject 
to the same defects as the Stauffer survey: It was not the rm: 
of consensual agreement and the lot lines do not follow natural 
boundaries. The survey locates the parcels around each home, 
comprising approximately 10 acres collectively, and locates som< 
fenced farm land of 46 acres. Mr. Malnor, who made this survey, 
testified that "it is impossible to survey the land" described 
...._.~...:.O~i\>.,.,u!:· ..... .,.,,~~·t>''.·~ •, ·'··," ,, ·.-·"--· ,::,,.,- .. _,.,, 
on the Uniform Real Estate Contract, and that the Call and Staufo 
surveys were "both . . . possibilities under its terms and neitr.1: 
,,.. "'""'·: ,.-.~;~..,.. •• , •• ,. ••• ,,-., .... ..,...·,.,~ '·' '•;<. ~-· •.••• , ., .:•' .,_ ., ........... , ... '"' ., -~-1 _., - ......,., ' 
cati" .be~·~;~:i.d to be more accurate than the other." R 89 i T 275:11· 
- ...... ...,,,,_,,d•<'-~ ........... ~-~,.. .......... ·,B">:t+·;...,_,..;i.<,'.,:.;,)"l"k·•·i" ',,,, 
277:25. Appellants waived cross-examination. Id. 
~k'~~~~....,..~r,\~p···''• ~_,,,,.,r,~/\·.,...,v,.•t"·-"""t;"•''"'~I''""•...........,,.,...... 
1 
The parties could not a~ree OJ:l. ~i.~~~~.!' .. ~1:1.E.Y~Y. ~~L~~!._ 
;,_,;..;'•»:,..-.0.1, I > ,,,.[." ' 
suit was filed in January, 1973. 
~~.ill'L.,,..........,...,.,....,,,_o..,..,..,'ll:lll,~~\~.•,,_,,.,.·,,.,.:.,..,•:''::"l<'"1c·•-J ,.,,,,,..-. 
Possession 
In the period of negotiation, 1969-1972, the Stauffer: 
were in possession of parts of the property to the exclusion °1 
others, ex~~pt-~h~~,;·'"~';,,;h~;~,,~h~;~·"i;~-~·;d·":·~me land. It was 
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;~ipulated that they had_ e.xcl~si~e po~.s.e~~ .. ~~1: ~.~ .. _the .. ,,1:~?-~'?.~.s~;s. 
140 :l4-18. This possession, however, was ~?_:_: .. !.:~~:Z::~~~.1":~~r.:, 
actual. Mr. Stauff:: ~~.~-»_a_t_ al!': .. :~:11~.~ .. }:.~~~;'ant to t~~-s .. ~ction, 
--------· --· 
·employed as a school teacher in California. T 16:27. From 
been . _...... .... .. ........... ~ .... ---_,. ......... ., .... , ...... ,., .. ""·'···"· "··--
1969~1971 he came to the Utah property only on week-ends during 
• _... _ _.. ........... -,--_..: .. ,-... ;.,,,.;_ ..,_,, -~ o]A.~ ... ,;.. ••• '~'~" "'·-· ..,.., -,~ ..... •' ,.._ 'c•> .- •"' " ........ •• ?. , t•.~, ,b• .»•,•:. .. ~ ,,._;; ·"~ ' _.., • ••,•• 
th;;hool session. T 217:28-218:10. The Stauffers moved 
- .......... , ...................... ~'~.--:: . ...,.· . .,,_;_,_,,,...'•'";~ 
1;k-~o California in the fal_l of 1971 but have since ret~~Eed 
to-the property. T 218: 18-219: 4. The possession, while not 
co~tinuous, has been sufficient to exclude others from the land 
except as they leased it. They in fact received $4,000 from 
.•·~-'"--, ... : ,,- ~_, -.- ....... ,..,_,.,_~-:'J":'·r-~""-.._.,..,,,._.·,1 .. ~•.•",-.•f<..,. 
rents. Finding No. 11. The testimony of an expert, stipulated 
--~ .. -~-~·,,·,..~ •,•'> 0• ... J:_, .• ,{o-l,>0'-••<M• J"',_., µ-0(•"0•,!;.0 ,o- ~~I;.-':~-.;.•.' .. •,,~,._-,'' _: .. ..., ....... ·.,.·,,,c,-'.\>»ir/( 
as~· was that offsetting monies already_ paid under,~h!'!, ... C?P~~r~£t 
, ' .. - , .·- .· ., ,· ..... ,• , - .. ·. '• 
by the reasonable val_u~ of .. st,~u!f,~p ' ... .PQ.~.§~.~~):,,01.l,.}~.e~.;~,"'~'~U"t,:r:.~~~~lt 
.-:;: . .,.~. -· ..... - ',. 
i;the sum of $15, 728 b~ing du~. ~:.S.P.?~~e,~~~~C.~.~~-~,.~~P-~tb~t,,s. 
~.,.,,, ..... , 
Finding No. 12 . 
Improvements 
The Stauffers adm~t~~-~.l! ~a-~~e, ~}:1P.~.~-~!:H8:!,~.!~fRX~~~'~Es 
on the property, and pled to recover the value thereof in their 
"'IQr.-.;..,..:~":"-,,,:,, 1'.<-.J "°'"'n••"':••'~r>f.,.;""-~·:c.· ~·.ol."; \~)" ·· ",.;-.1.,.'1"'"~~'-'·"' .: • '' ~ ·"i'~·"· ·~·.••,,•J 
second cause of action. Finding No. 6. They voluntarily with-
" !lid-.-~"~ 
drew that claim, however, at trial and it was dismissed with 
--.._.. ,,._,.6.,..·...,-. ,......,.. ~~ •'- _f ....... ~·,.,..,',"...,·- ., ; •• .;., •,•";'""; !~,~--~·.,;,.• ,., ..... -~,,.,, •~ .. ;;.· ;r • .,.-.,,.,.,,,.,,\ "'~ ~'<-,,.'., "'""""""'""""""°"''·.1·.,., ... ;:.?11-,~.f',.1lo"~"''•-
prejudice. Finding No. 9 and Conclusion No. 5. 
Appellants conceded that the improvements were not 
alleged to ~~--;~--;~~i<l-J;;i;;·b:;~~~=;·:""'~;~~·~~:·~~:irt 
,,,., ,_, . .,, ·-.·-:.-;-.....,__, ... .,.~ .. ·.,·-·y· ..... .,, ... -,'f!.,· .. ~ ..... ~ ..... ~"'" 
would not accept it as proof of boundaries. T 122: 25-123: 3. 
Sunset Canyon Corporation 
During the pendency of the litigation, Mr. Call, to 
.. ~~,.~------~ .... , ....... ~:i...- .. _ ... __ ~-.J.._..,~.~,--..-·"-'"'~""'.._,..~\U· ....... ;;.;...,~ .. ,. .... 
save further expense, sold whatever interest he had in all the 
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land, subject to the lawsuit, to Sunset Canyon 
-------·-·~"'--.-~.-~ Corporation Wh'· ' le, 
"""'-.,, 
All parties asserted their was properly joined as a defendant. 
-~, ................... .,_,,A ... _..,,~•.\'(,;o._>,-• 
claims in good faith. Finding No. 1.3. 
History of the Case 
Negotiations continued following the filing of the 
complaint, and when it became apparent that agreement was 
impossible, Respondents moved for leave to file a counterclaim 
for "the reasonable rental value of the premises." R 45-50. 
__...-.---""""'- _., ,_.,.., -~,,, .• ~r., .. ,,. 
The motion was granted by Judge Robert F. Owens, District 
Judge Pro Tem. R 50. A year and a half later the case came 
to trial, being noticed for trial by Respondents. The record 
will reflect that interrogatories regarding mesne rents md 
entry on the land by Respondents' appraiser was ordered under 
Rule 37 and over Appellants' objection. R 55-56; 61-63; 70-74; 
105. 
The case was tried May 11 and 12, 1977, in the Fifth 
__._,._..,....._ ... r~·_,..,..,.-. .. ,, .......... ,,,,.,~_,__,,,,;,...., ,.,,,_, ,r . ...,._, , . .; .. .,,., ·,. 
Judicial District, at the Washington County Courthouse before th1 
Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge. The court specificalh 
found_ the_ land d~sc~iptfon iqst,i,:t;fi9i~t§./ and concluded it was 
i~ca~~b-~e·-~·~··::;or:ement.Z./ The contract was also obje~t~9;:able 
as being preliminary and incomplete; the parties 
__......,._...,.,....,,. ......... ~-1»-~-,;.,"-,,.•i::-."""'-:,./~·-;! ,,..., .. ~,.:.-·,.,._ .. _ .. - - .... ·"·---·-... g ._ .... ~~ ~ .. 
their intent was simply to agree to agree __ '._/ 
~'"""··•~ 'O~~' '·.;,•;o,:t-,_,__·1«-..-'·'"-~-'-",-....•••,''· ' _ ......... ..-..-
confirming _that 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery of improveme!}ts as ar. 
.,,.,_.~ .. -............ , ........ ""..-"" , .... ·" 9/ 
alternative to enforcement was dismissed, by their reque.st.-
__ ..,..,,,..._.,,_,_,, 
Plaintiffs' claim to recover money paid underJ!Je 
contract ,...,.,_,_,_..,~., . ., ... '"'-~~~,the;·:;~~--~;:~~~d,-;~d~~e?t. for $9_,2!0: ,.~~.~.~~r-~J.;l.t.~d, _._,,,_,,,,_.~-~-· ..... . .. ~ .... " ... 
,.,.,,. . .:~''·~,,~.:-. .... 
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Findings as to the reasonable rental value of the 
property were made by the court, bu_t .. ~esP,ondents_w,~,r~- ~he,~ied 
. d ment based upon judicial findings of laches and that the 
Ju g . . ._ . ·.. """""'·' _,., ... , ,. .... " . " .... ''"""·" ~ ........ . 
· .. . . " 1 t. i " th 1 · ll I 
. ue of rents was u ra v res e awsuit. -
!SS .......... ,.,.,~,. .... -~----~··-·"·"""""'···-~- ... _ ... ,. ~·.--~•·• 
Appellants have appealed the judgment as to the 
enforceablity of the contract, and Respondents have cross appealed 
the denial of damages for the rental value of the property. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants' challenges to the factual findings or legal 
rulings below must be viewed in light of accepted standards of 
appellate review. Presumptions of validity attach to factual 
findings made by the trial judge in his unique position, and these 
findings are ordinarily not overruled on appeal unless all rea-
sonable minds would necessarily find as the plaintiff-appellant 
contends. Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 P. 2d lllO, lll2 (Utah 
1977). Furthermore, the trial court is presumed to have found 
most credible the evidence supportive of the judgment. Id. 
Similarly, rulings of law, while not so conclusive on the 
appellate court, will only be set aside when it manifestly 
appears the law was mis a pp lied. Brown v. Board of Education, 
560 P.2d 1129, ll31 (Utah 1977). 
POINT I 
THE LAND DESCRIPTION IS INSUFFICIENT 
The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the 
parties as to their interpretation of the land description, 
and with regard to the expert testimony of a surveyor, 
specifically found the Uniform Real Est:at:E! g9ri:tr.~!?t _ !.ec~~?~1?le 
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of describing "with particularity any discernible tract of 
~-,.~ . ..., ... ,~_,,., ··-
land." Finding No. 4. The contract was declared to be 
unenforceable because of the insufficient description and 
~_.1~___._,. • .,.,..,,_,_. • .._.~ • ...,;,.or.""''"''-''"·-"' .~,...,/ " ., .. - ·· -··'-•-'" 
because the parties had never agreed on boundaries, but only 
agreed to agree. Conclusions No. 1 and 2. 
Specific Performance 
The trial court properly invoked established Utah 
case law stating the requisites for application of the specific 
performance remedy. Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 
423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967), succinctly stated these requirements 
In speaking of certain terms required for specific 
performance, the author in 49 Am.Jur., Specific Perform-
ance, Section 22, at page 35 uses this language: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, 
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture 
or to be supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently 
certain and definite in its terms to leave no reasonable 
doubt as to what the parties intended, and no reasonable 
doubt of the specific thing equity is called upon to have 
performed, and it must be sufficiently certain as to its 
terms so that the court may enforce it as actually made 
by the parties. A greater degree of certainty is required 
for specific performance in equity than is necessary to 
establish a contract as the basis of an action at l~ 
for damages. 
The essence of the Stauffer-Call contract, the land description, 
is deficient in this case. The "land description" used by the 
parties was general and broad, not specific and certain. 
More particularly described as follows: SEE enclosed 
legal description. Stauffer's to purchase two hous7s " 
using the natural bounderies [sic], which is approximately 
10 acres collectively PLUS approsimately [sic] 1/5 water 
rights. 
Call' s to retain the fenced natural farm ground on the . 
SE (south side from Interstate Freeway) which is. a~proxi· 
mately 40 acres PLUS 2/5 water rights. The remaining 
ground SE of the old highway to be Stauffer's along 
with the two houses. 
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Stauffer's to purchase 1/2 of all remainin9 property 
to be owned as tenents in common with Call s. 
While Appellants at one time contended the legal description 
of all of Mr. Call' s land, referred to and attached, described 
the property they purchased, their testimony at the trial 
specifically confuted this argument. 
THE COURT: All right. . In other words, you un<ier-
stood that. thoseaesci'ipEionf~~ier~ 'j'usT"a"~nei~l 
descriptfon of all the property involved th.:lt.Ji.e .. 
[Mr. CallJ owned? 
THE WITNESS [Mr. Stauffer] Yes. 
THE COURT: ~l15L that whc_i. tever it was .. Y().1+ .. wei:~ . 
buying would J:lo.t,J?~. ~~fi~E;!d J?y the geriera,l descr~p­
tlOn~aHached ther_eto, Plaintiffs'· Exhibit 17? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. T 65: 7-14 
'-------
The attached legal descriptions were therefore facts of independent 
_., -. --- --"'~· _. _,.___ '4,_ - .. ,,, , ,_.,.-. _.,. '~~--,,1- .. ---·~·~---··,.-· l, -,~- .. ,.·.- ,, • 
significance and external reference rather than an operative part 
__ _.... . ..- '--··~----~-'"-·-·.,,..._,__..;,,• .. ~·~><•~'~.,.._..-,..,;r __ "•cJ".·-~ '--~· _ ,:~ ~ ... ·,~--~---··-·"'--·-u 1 ,, ... ,.,,._..; 
of the document. The operative language, descriptive of the 
land to be transferred and retained, was that set forth on the 
face of the contract replete with the infinitive tense and 
drafted in a homemade, tentative style. 
As further noted by the Pitcher court, the judiciary 
does not assume the power to compel parties, in the name of 
specific performance, to do things they have not agreed to do, 
by enforcing judicially-supplied terms. 
Specific performance cannot be required unless 
all terms of the agreement are clear. The court 
cannot compel the performance of a contract which 
the parties did not mutually agree upon. (Pitcher, 
~a. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155 Colo. 
82, --r7o P.2d 271 (1946)). 
The Bowman opinion, referred to in Pitcher, explained 
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the rationale for such strict requirements of proof of actual 
agreement, citing Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 
179, 42 L.Ed. 584 (1897): 
'Equity,' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere's 
Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1, 14, 7 L.Ed. 27, 'may compel 
parties to perform their agreements, when fairly 
entered into, according to their terms; but it 
has no power to make agreements for parties, and 
then compel them to execute the same. The former 
is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and 
in its exercise is highly beneficial to society. 
The latter is without its authority, and the 
exercise of it would be highly mischievous in 
its consequences.' 
[I]t must be clearly established that the demanded 
performance is in accordance with the actual 
agreement of the parties. (170 P.2d at 276). 
Agreements to Agree 
A corollary of the requirement of certainty reflec-
tive of other equitable considerations is the rule that courts 
will not compel parties to agree. In Whitehill v. Lowe, 10 
Utah 419, 37 P. 589 (1894), the Utah Supreme Court declined to 
enforce a contract for the joint operation of a mine "upon the 
basis to be agreed upon." 37 P. at 590. Thus, where contracts, 
by explicitly requiring future agreement, or by implicit require 
ment shown by deletion of essential terms, contemplate future 
agreement, they are unenforceable. Id. See also, Davison v. 
Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973). Simply stated, 
a contract to reach a meeting of the minds, with free and full 
assent, can not be enforced. 
Statute of Frauds 
Overlaid on the requirements of certainty prerequisite 
d h nenforce to invoking the remedy of specific performance an t e u 
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·i·ty of agreements to agree is the statutory demand that 
ab1 l 
tracts for the sale of land be in writing, or evidenced by a con 
sufficient note or memorandum. 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party by whom the lease or 
sale is to be made, or by his lawful agents thereunto 
authorized in writing. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-3. 
Contracts not so evidenced are void. 
This Land Description 
The above three doctrines - the prerequisites of 
specific performance, the unenforceability of agreements to agree, 
and the Statute of Frauds - all repeatedly appear in the body of 
Utah case law applied by the trial court. as the contract land 
description is objectionable on all three grounds. A general 
statement of the Utah requirements of specificity of description 
was made in Jacobson v. Cox, ll5 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 714, 721 (1949). 
A description is sufficient if when read in the 
light of the circumstances of possession, ownership, 
situation of the parties, and their relation to each 
other and to the property, as they were when the 
writing was made, it identifies the property. A des-
cription is sufficient, although vague in respect of 
the boundaries, if it identifies a specific tract of 
land when applied to the facts on the surface of the 
earth, as where a surveyor with the contract in his 
hands and with the aid of no other means than those 
provided, could go to the place stated therein and 
accuratelr, located the land. 49 Am.Jur., "Statute 
of Frauds ' §348. 
In this case, the unchallenged and uncontested testimony of the 
surveyor, and indeed the disparity between the two surveys. 
clearly indicates the contract land description is not surveyable 
With certainty. See R 89; T 275: 22-277: 25; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
18 
and Defendants' Exhibit 2. 
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Consider the remarkably apposite case of ~' 
8 Utah 39, 29 P. 740 (1892). The pertinent part of the agr 
eemen; 
therein stated: 
Also do I sell to N. K. Ardahl a part of any lot 
on the bench, size 6 x 10 rods deep, to be taken 
either way from my house, for the sum of seventy-
five ($75.00) dollars per rod, or, if it is taken 
6 x 20 rods, for the sum of one hundred ($100.00) 
dollars per rod. 29 P. at 740. 
On appeal, the Reed court noted that the seller's corner lot 
was 20 rods square, and there was frontage available on either 
of the two streets which passed the lot, 16 rods on one street 
and 18 rods on the other. The parcel conveyed could, therefore, 
have fronted either street, and could have been the six rods 
nearest the house or any other six rods. The Utah Supreme Court 
thus concluded that "[t]he contract attempted to be made is void 
for uncertainty." 29 P. at 741. 
In the instant case, the land description provides for 
even more possibilities. How many ways can boundaries be drawn 
around the two houses to total "approximately 10 acres collective! 1 
The supposed "natural boundaries" relied on when the contract 
was. drafted in California were found not to exist when the partie: 
negotiated in Utah. In fact the term "natural boundaries" itself 
is naturally offensive, being patently vague and uncertain. 
Patton on Titles §890. Simply stated, there is no way of fixing 
the land description to any ascertainable tract or tracts. 
At trial, all parties conceded this--Appellants' counse. 
d l' ate stipulating that more proof was necessary to properly e ine 
the land description. T 35:19-21. Beyond that, however, both 
parties testified that the description in the contract was 
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that the boundaries would have to be worked out, preliminary, 
1~ and that the contract represented but an agreement to agree. 
TBl:7-9; 82:27-29; 170:14-15; 244:15-22; 266:10; 266:17-21. 
The trial court found that the subsequent "agreement" was simply 
never concluded, the presupposed and hoped for meeting of the 
minds never having taken place. Finding Nos. 5 and 7. See, e.g. , 
Andrewsv. Swapp, No. 15145 (1978). Thus, a second standard 
canon of contract construction also supports the trial court's 
finding of unenforceability, that is, that the parties' treatment 
of the contract as a preliminary agreement, subject to negotiation, 
rendered it unenforceable. T 106:30-117:1; and T 131:30-
132:7; 132:10-13; 133:2-22; 133:27-134:3. 
In light of bo:~-r~,~~~~'.:,~~~~!~_;_e,!_~~~!~~J?.X 
the finding that they intended to agree on the boundaries of 
' '' !""' ,•,.,..,~.;.,...: ~ •• ~' - ,-,- _,,~-~-"f .. .- . ..., "'""·'" .: .. --~ ·"' ... _,';,., ;,..,: .. ,,.,:;r,,<'i;::.~::i-J • ..:~.:.~~~1: ... ;:. """14-
the parcels conveyed, and implicitly those retained, at a 
• :: .- _ , ,;:--::.: • .._ .- . ,.;,""" · '": •. ,.~ '.o, ,,,/ '.·. ;c:;"<:: 1i_~~'!r-...~··.•r:-~,. .. ~ ~:;.,. ..._,,. ~ , ,..; ... ......; 
later date, the case of Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 
.._----... '··'·' ~-
~!1 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) should be carefully examined, as it is 
remarkably applicable. 
In Davison, the prospective purchasers offered to 
purchase a parcel of property for $90. 00 per acre. The executed 
contract provided that the present owners were to order a survey 
to determine the net acreage to be conveyed after their reservation 
of an area designated only as the "bottom land". The final sale 
was expressly contingent on buyers' approval of the net acreage 
description supplied by sellers. 
The plaintiff-buyers sued for specific performance 
and attempted to define the term "bottom land" through parol, 
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testifying that defendant-sellers had pointed to certain 
fence lines, posts and a highway to delineate the property to 
be retained. The findings of the trial court reflected a 
belief in the plaintiff-buyers' parol version of the transaction, 
though defendant-sellers vigorously denied this testimony. 
The trial court found that the contract was valid and enforceable 
and decreed specific performance thereon. The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed, stating that an agreement to agree on a land descriptio: 
is not enforceable. 
In the instant action, the agreement in clear 
and unambigous terms provided that the location and 
description of the land to be conveyed was subject 
to the future mutual agreement of the parties. This 
writing constituted a mere expression of a purpose 
to make a contract in the future for the whole matter 
was contingent on further negotiation. The trial 
court erred in its conclusion that the writing con-
stituted a valid, enforceable contract. 30 Utah 2d 
at 341. 
Davison stands clearly for the proposition that 
where the description of land is left to future agreement, 
the contract is unenforceable. It further constitutes a definiti; 
statement of Utah law on agreements to agree and the multi-facet<: 
objection to such agreements when they pertain to the selection 
of real property, i.e. , that such agreements violate the proscri;· 
tions against specific enforcement of agreements to agree and the 
Statute of Frauds. In accord are all the cases Respondents have 
been able to find where the land to be conveyed has been subject 
to future agreement or approval. See Wardlaw v. Wardlaw, 184 
S.E. 873 (Ga. 1936); Scanlan v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 
N.W. 1031 (1890); Camden and Amboy R.R. Co. v. Stewart, 18 
N.J. Eq. 489 (1867). 
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Davison stands for the additional proposition that 
acts alleged to supply a sufficient description are parol 
incompetent to do so, the Court specifically rejecting buyer's 
parol testimony accepted by the trial court as to the sellers' 
· out certain boundaries. pointing Simply stated, such testimony 
was used to supply a description otherwise defective and subject 
to approval, not to cure it. 
Defendants further contend that the agreement 
does not describe the property to be reserved with 
sufficient certainty to support a decree of specific 
performance, and the trial court erred in admitting 
parol evidence to cure this defective description. 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to 
supply, a description of lands in the contract. 
Parol evidence will not be admitted to complete a 
defective description, or to show the intention with 
which it was made. Parol evidence may be used for 
the purpose of identifying the description contained 
in the writing with its location upon the ground, 
but not for the purpose of ascertaining and locating 
the land about which the parties negotiated, and supply-
ing the description thereof which they have omitted 
from the writing. There is a clear distinction be-
tween the admission of oral and extrinsic evidence 
for the purpose of identifying the land described and 
applying the description to the property and that of 
supplying and adding to a description insufficient and 
void on its face. Id. 
Therefore, even if Mrs. Stauffer's testimony about 
the walking, talking, and placing of rocks is believed, over 
the trial court's rejection of such testimony, the fact remains 
the testimony is parol and has been used to supply an insuf-
ficient description admittedly subject to future mutual agree-
ment and approval. The trial court neither found this testimony 
credible or persuasive. Beyond that, such testimony is incompetent 
to cure the facially defective description. Succinctly, the 
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Statute of Frauds declares such agreements void, and these and 
similar attempts to cure them incompetent. 
Appellants may argue the Statute of Frauds does not 
apply because of the doctrine of part performance. Their 
attempted reliance on the doctrine was earlier rejected at trial 
because the court found that as to boundaries there was no 
agreement, "oral or otherwise". Finding No. 7. Even if an 
agreement had been found, the threshold requirement of part 
performance - a clear showing of a definite parol contract . 
could not be met, even if Mrs. Stauffer's testimony is 
accepted. The contract must be shown before its performance 
can be accepted as evidence of its validity. 
To call anything a part performance, before the 
existence of the thing (the contract) whereof it 
is said to be part performance is established, is 
an anticipation of proof by assumption, and gets 
rid of the statute by jumping over it, for the 
statute requires proof, and prescribes the medium 
of proof. Roberts on Frauds, 135. Adams v. 
Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465, 466 (1915). 
Modern Utah law has strictly required an unequivocal 
showing that there was an actual agreement complete in all its 
terms. 
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, 
definite, mutually understood, and established by 
clear, unequivocal and definite testimony, or other 
evidence of the same quality. Christensen v. 
Christensen, 9 Utah 2d 102, 339 P.2d 101 (1959). 
Holmgren Brothers, Inc., v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 
614-('tJtah 1975). 
Mrs. Stauffer's testimony of the agreement was not clear, 
unequivocal, and definite as Holmgren requires. She admitted 
that some boundaries were not agreed upon, but merely set by 
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the surveyor. T 112:7-9; 135:22-136:5. Her testimony also 
failed to explain how she and Mr. Call were able to pace off 
parcels of 1. 00 acres, 4. 00 acres, and 5. 00 acres. And there 
. the fact that the Stauffers got exactly ten acres, remains 
while Mr. Call' s 40 acres turned out to be only 18 acres. 
Again, the threshold prerequisites to the invocation of the part 
performance doctrine, as recently enunciated in Holmgren, have 
not been met. The trial court so found, and to apply the doctrine 
in the instant case would not only look askance at this factual 
finding, but convert the doctrine of part performance into the 
bootstrapping nightmare envisioned by the Utah Supreme Court as 
early as 1915 in the Adams case. 
Thus, there are insurmountable bars to the Appellants' 
claim of adequate description. First, the standards for specific 
performance require certainty; second, the enforcement of an 
agreement to agree is impossible; third, the Statute of Frauds 
requires a writing. The trial court found the written contract 
uncertain and specifically an agreement to agree, rejecting 
Mrs. Stauffer's claim of a parol agreement. Even if this Court 
finds her testimony so overwhelmingly credible on the cold 
record so as to reverse the findings below, the obstacle of the 
Statute of Frauds remains. Part performance cannot remove the 
hurdle, as Mrs. Stauffer's alleged agreement is so uncertain 
and incomplete, and the use of the doctrine first requires a 
clear and unequivocal showing that an agreement was concluded. 
No such finding was even superficially made. 
-25-
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS FOR SUFFICIENCY 
OF LAND DESCRIPTION ARE UNSUPPORTED 
BY THE FACTS AND ARE CONTRARY TO LAW. 
Appellants' arguments contending that the land descrip 
tion is sufficient were presented earlier to the trial court and 
rejected. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities, R 107, 
Point VI and VII, at R 118 and 120. 
A. Appellants' First Argument 
Appellants' first argument (Brief of Appellant, [here· 
inafter AB] Point I, at 4) is bottomed in the supposition that 
the contract operated to convey all the land owned by Mr. Call 
and therefore the only ambiguities arise when the contract 
"conveys" land back to Mr. Call. Stauffers, however, specifical:; 
rejected the idea that the general land description described tni: 
purchase. T 65: 7-14. Further, the court, in cons truing the 
instrument, specifically rejected the notion of "conveyance of 
all and conveyance back". Finding No. 3. Finally, the idea 
that the contract operated immediately to convey all of Mr. Call': 
land was not entertained by any of the parties, but only by 
Appellants' attorney; and he declared at trial that the contract 
in fact was not designed to convey all the land to the Appellants 
but only a part. T 8: 18-27. Both the Stauffers and the Calls 
clearly viewed the documents as preliminary, with other negotia-
tions necessarily to follow before the transaction became final, 
especially as to land description. T 81: 7-9; 82: 27-29; 106:JO· 
ll7:1; T 131:30-132:7; 132:10-13; 133:1-22; 133:27-134:3; 170:l4·: 
244:15-22; 266:17-21. 
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Appellants' argument that the documents should be 
trued against Mr. Call because he drafted them flies in cons 
the face of the facts. See AB at 6. Mr. Stauffer came with 
preliminary notes to put into final form; Mr. Stauffer had 
the contracts; Mrs. Stauffer typed the documents; Mr. Stauffer 
was the real estate agent. Admissions on cross examination 
and the general lack of credibility undermine the assertion 
that Call, a pharmacist, drafted the instrument. See 
Footnote 3, infra, and related text, supra. The argument 
that parties are bound by the language they use is correct -
when the language is binding. When it is indefinite, it 
does not bind. Appellants assert that "having specifically 
supplied the wording . . . Defendants cannot now claim that 
the wording means other than what it says." AB at 6. 
Appellants seem to forget that no one is sure what the 
agreement says, least of all the surveyors. T 276-277. 
Appellants conclude their argument claiming that 
the specific controls over the general, and therefore the 
"specific" attached land description controls. Appellants 
have not recognized that the land description was attached 
and referred to as a general description of Mr. Call' s land, 
and that the specific manner of division is laid out on the 
face of the contract. Indeed, the specific should control, 
and it is the specific means of dividing the larger tract 
into smaller parcels of conveyed and retained lands which is 
vague and uncertain. 
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B. Appellants' Second Argument 
Appellants' second argument is that any defects in 
the land description were cured by Mr. Call' s marking of the lan 
boundaries. AB at 7. It must be remembered that the lower cour: 
did not accept Mrs. Stauffer's testimony of boundary marking as 
credible, and Mr. Call flatly denied this event. Finding No.); 
T 252: 12-253: 5. Thus, in the court's view no clarifying parol 
acts occurred. Ultimately, not only does Appellants' argument 
fly in the face of Call' s denial of such an event, said denial 
being accepted by the trial court, but it fails to recognize 
that such self-serving testimony, even if believed, would be 
incompetent to cure the defective description under the ~ 
ruling, and clearly insufficient to meet the burden of proof 
standard enunciated in Holmgren. 
Appellants then alter their focal point from the allei': 
acts of Call to those acts attendant to their possession of some 
rather undefined areas of the larger Call parcel. Appellants ci:i 
Brown v. Ward, llO Iowa 123, 81 N.W. 247 (1899) for the propositi. 
that taking possession of land cures a deficient description. 
The description in Brown was defective only in failing to state 
the county, and thus Brown is inapposite to the instant case. 
81 N.W. 248. While Respondents have been unable to locate 
[In] Ray [Re] McKee's Estate, 31 Pittsburgh Legal Journal (N.S.) 
we suspect it may be as readily distinguishable. Salient here 
is that Appellants' counsel readily conceded at trial that the 
possession and improvements were not such as would define 
boundaries and were not offered for that purpose. T 122:25-12
3 
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Their import does not now mystically change because we are on 
appeal. 
Thus, the argument that any acts subsequent to the 
contract were curative of the deficient description fails on the 
facts and was rejected by the lower court. Appellants' counsel 
is simply making the same argument made in his memorandum 
before trial, ignoring the trial court's and his clients' 
rejection of these allegations. 
C. Appellants' Third Argument 
Appellants' third argument is that the contract is 
severable in that some of the eight specific parcels comprising 
the greater description of Mr. Call' s land were unaffected by 
the conveyancing clause. Again, the trial court and Appellants' 
testimony specifically rejected the notion that the attached 
descriptions were the operative parts of the contract. Finding 
No. 3; T 65: 7-14. The descriptions were merely referred to as 
independently significant, not integrally operative. Furthermore, 
the conveyancing description, in failing to delineate the exact 
nature of the boundaries that went with each house and those of 
the farm retained by Call, leave the "remaining ground" to be 
held as tenants in common equally unsusceptible to determination. 
Simply stated, if the part cannot be defined, it begs the question 
that the remainder is also incapable of definition. It is, thus, 
a well-established principle that where a larger description 
is certain but exceptions and reservations are uncertain, the 
whole contract fails for uncertainty. Smith v. Wilkinson, 
208 Ga 489, 67 S.E.2d 698 (1951) and Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39, 
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29 P. 740 (1892). As stated in Mims v. '.';illis, 90 S.E. lOJS, 
1036 (Ga. 1916), "the whole contract stands or falls together". 
Conclusion 
Appellants' arguments for certainty all fail as 
they require a rejection of the facts found below. Further, 
each argument is contrary to established rules of law. 
The description was found, and is, insufficient and 
unenforceable. 
POINT III 
APPELLANTS' PROPOSED CHANGES OF UTAH LAW 
WOULD BE AN ILL-ADVISED REGRESSION FROM 
SOUND STANDARDS OF UTAH CONVEYANCING LAW 
AND DECISIONAL AUTHORITY. 
The fourth and fifth arguments made by Appellants 
admit the insufficiency of the land description and propose 
novel remedies founded in case law of the early 1800's of 
dubious authority from other jurisdictions. 
Utah decisional law has developed a sound body of 
precedent which provides certain and clear standards by which 
land descriptions may be judged. See Holmgren Brothers, Inc., 
v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975); Davison v. Robbins, 
30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973); Calder v. Third Judicial 
District Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168, 46 ALR 2d 887 (195\I 
Jacobson v. Cox, 115 Utah 102, 202 P. 2d 714 (1949); Campbell.!;, 
Nelson, 102 Utah 78, 125 P.2d 413 (1942); Adams v. Manning_, 46 
Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915); Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39, 29 P. 740 
(1892). 
The case law proposed by Appellants is a poor alter-
native to the sounder doctrines developed by the Utah courts. 
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and proposes that in the absence of an agreement, the court may 
b t ·cute its own and then enforce it. The Utah judiciary has su s l 
to date wisely declined this proposal. 
A. Appellants' Fourth Arguenmt 
Appellants' fourth argument proposes that this Court 
adopt "a counnon law canon of construction" as exemplified in 
cases of a "comparatively early time". AB at 9. This "rule" 
as Appellants state it, is that the grantee of a conveyance 
which has an indefinite description should be allowed to select 
land unilaterally. Thus, Appellants argue, they should be 
allowed to select their ten acres and Respondents should be 
allowed to select their forty acres. Appellants cite 23 Am. Jur. 2d 
Deeds §225 (1965) as authority for this doctrine. A reading of 
the entire section, however, reveals that the right of selection 
dealt with in §225 arises only upon a conveyance of an unlocated 
portion of a whole tract which is found by the court to have been 
intended as a conveyance of an undivided interest. This is made 
perfectly clear by a reading of the preceding section, §224. 
For example, if the gr an tor had conveyed "400 of my 1200 acres, 
an undivided interest" the courts would hold the parties intended 
to create a tenancy in common on a 400/1200 proportion of 
ownership. See Footnote 12. The finding of conveyance of an 
undivided interest and the right of selection specifically does 
not arise where there is "a conveyance . . . intended to transfer 
a particular part of a tract or lot." 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds §224 
0965) · In such a case, the deed "must contain a sufficient 
description to make the boundaries of the part intended to be 
ronveyed ascertainable." Id. 
-31-
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If anything is clear from the Stauffer-Call land 
description, it is that the parties intended to hold the ten 
and forty acres separately, and not as tenants in common. 
Therefore, the "ancient canon" does not apply. 
Further, a tracing of Appellants' excerpt from 
Am.Jur.2d through 16 Am.Jur. Deeds §§265-266 (1938) back to its 
origin in 8 R.C.L. Deeds §§140-141 (1914) reveals that "the 
usual holding seems to be against the right of election." Tracfo, 
the R.C.L. source, we find the following statement in 2 Ann.Gas. 
918 (1906); 
[The grantee] is not, however, as a rule, allowed a 
right of election as to the premises unless such 
right is conferred upon him by stipulation in the 
deed or subsequent agreement. 
Appellants, therefore, are seeking to have this Court 
adopt a remedy both inapplicable on these facts, and, even where 
appropriately invoked, applied only in a minority of jurisdictior.: 
which once considered the rule. 
Appellants also fail to note that they rely on authori: 
applicable to deeds, not to contracts, and particularly inapplici: 
to tentative, preliminary agreements. 
Appellants' claim that Calder v. Third District Court, 
2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P. 2d 168, 46 ALR 2d 887 (1954) supports the 
selection rule is a bold misrepresentation. In Calder the 
contract explicity provided that some of the land was to be 
selected by the buyer within 60 days of the execution of the 
contract. The Calder court did not impose the remedy of 
1 t · th t · d t it Thus, Calder simply stand> se ec ion, e par ies agree o . 
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for the proposition that if the right to select lands is 
unilaterally held and contracted for, then the contract de-
scription is enforceable. 
The Virginia and Texas cases cited by Appellants 
further illustrate the dubious validity of the remedy proposed. 
Ransomev. Watson's Administrator, 134 S.E. 707 (Va. 1926), 
involved a purchase money resulting trust imposed when two 
parties jointly purchased land, but one took the deed to the 
whole. The co-purchasers had a clear agreement on the location 
of the land each was to receive, and it was not disputed that 
the complaining party owned a specifically located tract. A 
later conveyance specifically found to have created a tenancy 
in common over the remainder was implicitly held to give the 
grantee a unilateral right of selection. Significant to the 
latter rule's invocation, however, was the specific finding that 
the later conveyance intended to convey a 2/ 3 undivided interest 
in the balance of the tract. In Utah, a similar result could be 
arrived at, that is, dividing otherwise accurately determined 
undivided interests, by a suit framed in partition. 
Turner v. Hunt, 116 S.W.2d 688 (Texas 1938), specifically 
noted that the right of selection could only arise when the 
parties' intent was to convey an undivided interest, not when 
the contractual language unsuccessfully sought to define a 
specific tract. Thus, in Turner, as the court found the parties 
intended to convey a specific tract, it declined to invoke the 
rule, and declared the description insufficient. 
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House v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 97 S.W.2d 
314 (Texas 1936), specifically found the instrument was · intended 
to convey an undivided interest and again distinguished the case 
from those situations in which the intent to convey a specific 
tract was unsuccessfully memorialized. 
Appellants' citation of Penney v. Booth, 220 s.w. 43 ~ 
(Texas 1920), is again supportive of Respondents' assertions. 
In Penney, the court found that the grantor's unsuccessful 
attempt to convey a specific portion of a larger tract failed 
for lack of specificity, the court further rejecting the notion 
specifically proposed by Appellants here, that is, that a right 
of selection should thereafter result as a creature of equity. 
As pertinently stated in Penney: 
This court recognizes the well-established rule 
that a deed for a given number of acres out of a larger 
tract of land, with the right of the purchaser to select 
its location on the larger tract, is valid, provided 
such selection is made by the purchaser and also the 
rule that a deed for a proportionate part of the larger 
tract, without the stipulation therein that the pur-
chaser may select and locate the land conveyed, is 
valid. But the majority, as before stated, holds that 
the deed from Sellers to Hannah Parker is not governed 
by either of the rules above stated, for the reason that 
it is not a deed for either a given number of acres out 
of a larger tract, with the right of the purchaser to 
select and locate the same, or for an undivided portion 
of a larger tract, but is a deed for a particular tract 
which is not described therein with that certainty 
required to pass title to lands, and therefore should . 
be governed by the rule laid down in the following cases. 
Davenport v. Chilton, 25 Tex. 519; Pressley v. Testard, 
29 Tex. 201; Penn v. Yellow Pine Lumber Co., 35 Tex. 
Civ.App. 181, 79 S.W. 842, Patton v. Rucker, 29 Tex. 
409; Johnson v. Granger, 51 Tex. 44; Zanderson v. 
Sullivan, 91 Tex. 503, 44 S.W. 484; Cannnack v. Prather, 
74 S.W. 355. 220 S.W. at 432. 
Clearly, Appellants' fourth argument is wholly 
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unreliable, without persuasive precedent, and is understandably 
rejected in Utah, as well as a majortiy of courts. 
B. Appellants' Fifth Argument 
Appellants' fifth argument also partakes of the defects 
of the fourth. Therein, Appellants claim that the parties should 
be declared tenants in common of all of Mr. Call' s land. In order 
to do this, Appellants propose that this Court adopt a rule that 
an attempt to convey a specific part of a larger tract of land, 
failing due to an insufficient description, should result in 
creation of a tenancy in common of the larger tract proportionate 
to the acreages specified in the contract. This result, however, 
again requires this Court to make a contract for the parties and 
then enforce it. Had the parties desired such a tenancy in common, 
they could easily have created it. 
Furthermore, Appellants' proposal or "ancient canon" 
is actually a part of the rule proposed in the fourth point. 
Thus, where a conveyance of unlocated acreage is intended to 
create a common tenancy, the courts have so construed the deed. 
As pointed out above, a small minority may have even allowed 
the grantee a subsequent right of selection of divided acreage. 
But again, these "rules" have never been applied where the 
intent was to convey a specific parcel in the first instance. 
This limitation is again illustrated by the authorities cited 
by Appellants. For example, in Gibbs v. Swift, 12 Cush. 393 
(Mass 1853), the grantor conveyed 211 acres out of a tract of 
1878 acres "in quality and privileges equally in every respect 
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with the remainder". The conveyance was specifically held to 
have been intended as a tenancy in common. Jackson v. Li~ 
7 Wend. 136 (N. Y. 1831), again did not deal with an unsuccessfu; 
attempt to convey a specific tract, but, as decided, a parol 
partition of a recognized tenancy in corrrrnon. 131 Respondents fir. 
no case entitled L. I. Railroad Co. v. Conklin at 79 NY 572,an: 
further find nothing remotely related to Appellants' position i:. 
cases of the same caption at 29 NY 572 (1864) or at 32 Barb 
(N.Y.) 381 (1860). 
Conclusion 
Respondents concede that Appellants' proposals 
are ingenious, but flatly deny that they are authoritative, 
applicable, or appealing alternatives to the reasoned body 
of Utah law by which the lower court made its decision. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
APPELLANTS' POST-TRIAL MOTION. 
Following the trial and entry of judgment, Appellanti 
moved for a new trial, or in the alternative, for amendment 
of the findings, conclusions and judgment. The ground of the 
motion was the alleged failure of the trial court to rule 
on a proposed amendment adding equitable affirmative defenses 
to Appellants' reply to Respondents' counterclaim. 
The Amended Reply to Counterclaim was mailed to 
counsel six days before the trial was set, and filed five days 
before trial. R 219-220; T 2:14-23. Defendants objected to 
. . 1 . allowin! the amended pleading and the court reserved its ru ing 
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or barring the amendment. T 2: 24-3: 8; 4: 28-5: 2. No explicit 
ruling was made at trial though Appellants were never prevented 
from putting on any evidence on the basis that the substance 
was immaterial, not being raised by the original reply. Subse-
quently, the parties' attention was drawn to Appellants' amended 
complaint, also served shortly before trial, which Appellants' 
counsel voluntarily withdrew. T 281: 9-11. The question of the 
amendment of the reply to the counterclaim was ignored. At 
trial, Appellants' counsel had ample opportunity more than once 
to bring this failure to rule to the attention of the court but 
failed to do so. See T 287:18-22; 292:25-27. It is, thus, 
reasonable to suppose that Appellants waived their motion to 
amend by lack of objection to the failure to rule. 
It is the duty of counsel for all parties to promptly 
call the court's attention to any error in the trial. 
Counsel may not secretly nurture an error, specu-
late upon a favorable verdict, and then, in the event 
it is adverse, bring forth the error as a life pre-
server on a motion for a new trial. Agranoff v. 
Morton, 340 P.2d 811, 814 (Wash. 1959). 
In any event, it appears that trial court gave due consideration 
~ ilie newly raised equitable defenses, as the specific reason 
the court ruled against the counterclaim was laches, an affirma-
tive defense under Rule 8, U. R. C. P. , raised for the first time 
in paragraph 7 of the Amended Reply, a reply which Appellants 
now contend was not considered by the trial court'. Conclusion 
No. 6, R 263; R 220, p. 
Repondents doubt the denial of the post-trial motion 
rose above the level of harmless error. U.R.C.P. 61. The 
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trial court heard the motion, and gave it due consideration. 
It cannot be said that the court's action clearly transgressed 
reasonable bounds of discretion, and again it is telling that 
the court did consider the last-minute defenses urged by Appel:, 
Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 619, 620 (Utah 1976). 
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CROSS APPEAL 
POrnT I 
THE DENIAL OF MESNE RENTS WAS A 
MANIFEST MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW. 
The trial court cited three reasons for rejection of 
Respondents' counterclaim for mesne rents; (1) "such claims are 
~ltra vires the lawsuit"; (2) such claims "are not set forth in 
the pleadings"; and ( 3) such claims "are barred by laches, no 
claim being made for them until late in the lawsuit." Con-
clusion No. 6, R 263. It is important to note that the court 
did not find the "laches" bottomed in the bad faith of Respond-
ents, but solely in Respondents not asserting the claim for 
mesne rents until late in the lawsuit. Indeed, the court found 
that both parties pursued their negotiations and the lawsuit in 
the utmost good faith, unfortunately without final resolution. 
Conclusion of Law No. 13, R 260. And, there is no evidence of 
bad faith on the part of either party. Id.; see also Record on 
Appeal. 
In light of the above, Respondents strenuously assert 
that the denial of mesne rents was arbitrary, and in fact based 
on the court's mistaken belief that Appellants had foregone 
their right to return of the monies paid pursuant to the contract. 
T289:11-30. Thus, as Appellants had occupied the land under 
some color of title, with Respondents receiving both their land 
back and keeping the payment, Respondents should not be entitled 
to more. Id. But again, this premise upon which the court 
based its 1 
ru ing was a mistaken one, as is evidenced by the 
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judgment against Respondents for $9, 228 for monies paid by 
Appellants on the unenforceable contract, with interest to d 
ate 
of judgment. Id.; R 267. 
This judicial mistake was further compounded by the 
Appellants' assertion of a very sympathetic stance in the 
litigation. Additionally, the personal effect that legal non-
cognizance of their claim might have had on Appellants continu; 
was infused into the record, despite some judicial effort to 
curb it, and notwithstanding its immateriality. See T 116:1-5, 
221:26-223:9; 230:25-30. And, it ultimately appears that the 
court was not totally unmoved by Appellants' demeanor, as is 
evidenced by the court's entertaining and requesting memoranda 
on Appellants' motion for attorney's fees under a contract they 
unsuccessfully claimed was enforceable. T 290:13-27; R 237-41; 
243-51. 
The emotional appeal of their case, however, cannot 
cause the broad powers of equity to operate contrary to law. 
Appellants had in fact not dismissed their claim for monies 
paid under the contract. Thus, though they had made the paymer,:: 
under the contract through September of 1972 and occupied the 
premises under color of title until 1977, they wanted their 
money back. This, they received. The is sue, therefore, before 
the court should naturally have been what benefit the pur-
ported purchasers received when occupying, to the exclusion of 
the purported sellers, the latter's land. Recovery of mesne 
rents has been almost uniformly held to be the measure of 
this benefit. For example, in Roberts v. Le Brain, 248 P .2d W. 
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(Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 1952), the court declared a contract for the 
1 f a house void for insufficiency of description under the sa e o 
Statute of Frauds. The amount paid under the contract was $865. 00, 
and the lower court ordered it kept by the seller. The purchaser 
appealed, but the appellate court held the sum was reasonable 
compensation for lost rental. "To have required this [the return 
of the money paid] would have resulted in giving appellant the 
free use of the property since August, 1946." 248 P.2d at 814. 
Utah law also recognizes the right of Respondents to 
compensation for the reasonable rental value. In Campbell v. 
~· 102 Utah 78, 125 P.2d 413 (1942), the alleged con-
tract was found unenforceable and the court noted that the 
sellers had been deprived of the use and rent of the property, 
and were rightly awarded damages for the same. In another 
ejectment action, VanWagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 
670 (1921), the court could not "avoid the conclusion that the 
measure of damages was the rental value of the land . " 
199 P. at 678. See also Anderson v. Jense~. 71 Utah 295, 265 
P. 745 (1928) and Baker v. Goodwin, 57 Utah 349, 194 P. ll7 (1920). 
It is thus impossible to reconcile the trial court's denial of 
Respondents' recovery of rental value with prior Utah case law. 
Further, that denial imposes an egregious burden on Respondents, 
especially in light of the lower court's award to Appellants of 
over $9, 000 for sums paid under the contract. R 26 7. 
The lower court, however, was steadfast in its attempt 
to deny Respondents this recovery, ultimately finding technical 
grounds for precluding mesne rents - that somehow the issue was 
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not relevant to the lawsuit or present in the pleadings 
. or 
if present, pled too late for judicial cognizance. The full~~ 
will again refute these objections on the basis of the reco d 
r . 
Respondents filed their motion for leave to file a 
counterclaim in March 1975, when it became apparent that furthc: 
negotiation was hopeless. R 35. Counsel for both parties 
stipulated that the counterclaim would simply be put in the 
pretrial order. R 43, H. The pretrial set for April 15 was c: 
tinued and not re-set, so Respondents' counsel moved to file 
a formal pleading amending the answer to include a counterclaio 
R 45. The motion to file the counterclaim was granted in 
February, 1976, the Honorable Robert F. Owens, sitting pro tem, 
and it was filed the same day. R 50; 45. The counterclaim wai 
therefore filed before any discovery on mesne rents took place, 
and before any motions for judgment had been entertained. 
Thereafter, Respondents and Cross-Appellants conductec 
extensive discovery regarding the nature and dates of the 
improvements, and areas occupied, ultimately gaining entry on 
the land for Respondents and their appraiser for determination~, 
values for their counterclaim. R 55-56; 61-63; 70-74; and lOl. 
Discovery was completed over the continual objections of Appel· 
lants, and, unfortuantely, not without Respondents resorting to 
Rule 37, U.R.C.P. Id. Trial was held over a year later. Thus, 
Respondents and Cross Appellants can see no basis for the denia: 
of the claim for mesne rents on the grounds that it was not an 
issue or was barred by laches in having been presented too ~~ 
Conclusion of Law No. 6, R 263. 
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The latter conclusion, that of !aches due to the late 
ntment of the claim, is especially incongrous. Laches is prese 
anaffirmative defense under Rule 8, U.R.C.P., and is waived 
unless timely filed or tried by consent. It certainly was not 
tried by consent. R 227-28; T 2:18-3:8. Furthermore, laches 
was not raised or pled as a defense to oppose the counterclaim 
until three working days prior to trial, and yet the lower court 
entertained that defense to find that Appellants' counterclaim, 
filed fifteen months previous thereto, was untimely'. R 45-50; 
219; Conclusion of Law No. 6, R 263. 
Clearly, the lower court's denial of mesne rents is 
without foundation in the record. The facts for such recovery 
are clear. The Stauffers went into possession in the spring of 
1969, and remain there today. Finding No. 5. The parties 
stipulated and it was so found that offsetting the monies paid 
under the contract, which sum has been reduced to judgment, 
with the value of the mesne rents, would result in the sum of 
HS, 728 being due Respondents and Cross Appellants as of the 
time of trial. 14/ T 285-86; Finding No. 12; R 260-61. Yet, as 
the judgment stands, Appellants have had the use of the property 
for nine full years and have recovered all their money with 
interest. The fact that they have been disappointed in not being 
able to purchase the property does not entitle them to rent-free 
occupation for a period in excess of nine years, much of that 
time since 1973 when litigation was initiated, and a majority 
thereof · s since eptember 1972 when Appellants stopped further 
lJJments on the contract. Finding No. 8; R 260. Simply stated, 
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Respondents have been denied the reasonable use of the property 
for nearly a decade. Conversely, Stauffers have rented 80~ 
lands for their personal profit, have kept the money for their 
personal benefit, occupying other lands to the exclusion of 
Respondents. Findings No. 5 and 11. 
In conclusion, neither on the record nor in the law 
or in equity is there a legal basis for denial of mesne 
rents. As such denial is arbitrary and totally without founda· 
tion, it should be reversed. Further, on the basis of the facto 
on the record, as reflected in Finding No. 12, the present monev 
judgment should be vacated, and judgment entered for Respondent1 
and Cross Appellants in the sum of $15,728. R 260-261. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants' initial action sought specific enforcement 
of a real estate contract that is clearly unenforceable. Notable 
at trial were the admissions on both sides that the document 
memorialized but a preliminary agreement that both necessitated 
and contemplated the future agreement of the parties. No such 
future agreement was ever culminated. 
While Appellants took possession of certain areas of 
a larger parcel owned by Respondents, their possession was 
concededly not such as would define boundaries, and as "part 
performance" requires a prior clear and unequivocal showing of 
a completed contract, the improvements were also incompetent to 
overcome the inherent frailties of the land description. Again, 
the finding that the future contemplated agreement of the parties 
was not reached is both persuasive and pervasive. 
Appellants' novel solutions in somehow dividing the 
property or in creating a tenancy in common resemble inapplic-
able and often ill-conceived relics of foreign jurisdictions. 
Inherently, these remedies applied here would require that the 
judiciary re-draft the contract for the parties and then enforce 
it as judicially drafted. The Utah courts have vigorously 
abstained from such judicial intervention, refusing to invoke 
this abuse disguised in the cloaks of equity. 
While a well-reasoned body of Utah case law supports 
both the factual and legal affirmance of the decision below 
holding the contract unenforceable, Respondents' counterclaim 
for mesne 
rents was arbitrarily and doubtless mistakenly denied. 
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Allowed and pled by court order fifteen months prior t o trial, 
it is incongrous that the counterclaim should be found barred'" 
"I 
laches due to its untimely filing, when that affirmative def 
en11 
was raised only three working days prior to trial. 
The resultant inequity, that of allowing Appellants 
both the return of all monies paid under the contract, which 
payments were made only until September, 1972, and the rent-fr" 
occupation through 1977 of a substantial portion of the premisei 
should be reversed. 
Succinctly, the trial court's judgment as to the 
unenforceability of the contract should be affirmed, but the 
denial of Respondents' rightful claim to mesne rents should 
be, even with deference to the trial court, reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 5 --1-6, day of April, 
1978. 
ALLEN, THOMPSON & HUGHES 
:?l&i~ 
Attorney for Respondents and 
Cross Appellants 
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PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT 
/7 
11 
11 
I I 
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT IF NOT UNDERSTOOD. SEEK COMPElENT ADVICE· 
UNIFORM REAL EST ATE CONTRACT 
I 
J. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate thbi Second 
by and between Russell and VeJ mn Call 
day of_J_a_n_u_a_r~y ____ ,, A. D., 19~, 
hereinafter dcsignatrd as the Seller, and DRvid M. and Connie A. Stauffer 
hereinafter designated as the Ruyer, of -~"~P~1~d_,.p~r~OuPu0~· r~tY'1-------------------
2. WJTNESSETH: T~at th.e Seiler,_ for th~ consideration herein mentioned a~rees to sell and conve} to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the cons1derat1on herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real propdty, situate in 
the county of Washington , State of Utah, to·wit: Anderson• s Junction 
;:?.i More particularly described as follows: SEE enclosed legal descripti~ll~RESS 
'"'- Stauffer· s to purchase two houses using the natural bounderies, which 
~ ! is aooroximately lu acres collectively .t'LUS. approsimately l/;, water 
· 
1 
rights, 
,... 'Call·s to retain the fenced natural farm ground on the SE 1 south side 
1 from interstete ~·reeHcy J which is armroxtm8tely 40 acres J'LUS 2/5 
w3ter rights, The remaining ground SE of the old highwoy to be 
Stouffer•s along with the two houses, 
Stauffer· s to purchase 1/2 of all remaining prooerty to be owned as 
tenents in common with Call· s, · 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said dcsrribed premises the surn of - - - -
Twelve thous 0 nd and no/lOU ------------------------ 0011,., ($12,000,00 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order:.----.-,,-----~--------~-~­
~trictly within the following times, to-wit: One ThousG.nd and no/lOU ------ ($1,UOO.OO 
cash, the recript of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 11 1 000 00 shall be paid as follows; 
1il,U00, 00 already tendered to seller January 2, 1969. i 77;1i,). (, "U./ 
Additional $1,000,00 to by paid XfXlliolil:\XO.KXliiidIDlJOX r'ebrliary 1, '1'16'J 
Balance of 1110,000,00 to by po.id jfl00,00 or wore per month including 
; princioal and interest at the Pate of 6% beginning February 1, 196':1. 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the Second day of J anunry ,19~ 
4. Said mo11thly paymenbi are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from Febru i=iry 1. 1469 on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of Six per cent ( 6 o/r) per annum. The Burer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay Rmounts in e:xces~ of the monthly paymen~ upon the unpaid balance subject to th'! Jin,it··tinns of any mortgage 
or coutract by the Buyer herein t:.ssumerl, such excess to be 4lPPlied either to unpaid principal or ll' 1 (•payment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess paym· 1 ~ is made. 
5. It is understood and a~rccd that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this co11tract Jess than according 
to the terms herein n1entioned, then by so doin~. it will in no way alter the terms of the contrad as to the forfeiture 
hereinaft.cr stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of-------
--c~}~[O~N~E~-------------~~-------- with an unpaid balance of 
____ }_JO_N_E _____ ,., or _____ NONE 
7- Seller represt'.'nts that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
h.es now in the process of bf'ing installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following _____ }_TO_N_E _______________________ _ 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing int\:rest at the rate of not to exceed six percent 
(--~-·- r;,) per annum and payable in regular 1!iunthly installments; provided that the agrregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each inst.ailment payment requir('d to be 
madc by the Buyer under this contrH.ct. Wh~·n the principal due hereunder has bet>n reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortg-ag-es the Seller ar,rces to convl'y &.nd the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to sai41 loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer dC'sires to cxcrcit'e his right throug-h accelerated payments under this sgoreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date nf tlus agreenwnt nJ.:-ainst said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
PRY si.iy rcnalty which may be required on brepayment of si:11d prior obligations. Pre{;ayment penalties in respect 
~idob~b~~~~r;nsa~~~n~t55~~~el~~p~r;Kr~~~c'.rb~d bu~·e~~ller, after date of this agreement, s all be paid by seller unless 
JO. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the. Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
~~o~~~c~~s~0 ~r~~ ~bco~:eedm~~~i~~e~~e a~~g~~a~~oenc11ut~f tii~H~~;~~:rr=~~i~:Je:~d ag!~e~~~-h~frl}~hcn)~:p~~~2: :1~c~~c:ai;;di~pob~ 
ta1mnr. said lorm the Se!ler agrcein~ to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the . monthly paymcr.ts and 
iHll'i est rate rcq;iircd, shall not exceed the monthly pRyments 11.nd interest rate as outlined above. 
11. Thr Buyer agn·co. to pay all taxes and nsscssmcnts of cvC'ry kind nnd nature wh:ch are or which may be assessed 
11nrl whidi rnay hecorne due on these prl'rniscsc during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agr('es 
thnt then· ore no a:<sessmcnts against said premises except the following: 
I J..<il>J;J-1.1J.K.tQ_!Jnr1 t.rust deed of enoroximntoly !ll0,7tJ6,ltJ to :l.·'tl 
I ...G..il..so.n H Rohrback end GlennR s Rohrh<"lck 
I The Sdln further covenants nnd agre<'!I that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said prop<'rty. 
·- -·~==--=---=---------=------===-------_-____ .=~----------=--·-==---·=-----_--_-·=.-_-...:=.-_-_-_·_-·_--_· ____ 1 ·I-~ 
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12. The Ruyn agrees to pay the general taxes after ___Jp..~t\~!,\"""('"'t'--'"'11----'-{ _,_7_,,L?1_ ______ _ 
I 
I 
. ·- ----- ----------------
'' 
' 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all in<1urable buildings and improvements o'n uid premi1tcs insured in a com-
pariy 1u:·cer:tnL\e .to. lht> .Selll'r in the amount ~f ~ot les" than the unpaid balance on this contract, or$ ____ _ 
and to n.'!sii;;n said msurunce to the Seller as his mtcrest;:1 may appear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
pren~i~.rn~na!h;e;~~'~tp:~~iJ~d~'~'h: 1S~:1edref~~~t. i:t \!'i~ ~~fi~':~~a~~ s~YJ t:~~~i.a!.~~~~~~~~r~I a~adxi~~u6r~~~:~~~;iiu0:i!\i~;u;i~h~~ 
of then.1, and 1.f SC'!lt'r e\rcts .!-10 t_o do, then the Ruyer agree!! to repay the SC'~ler upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
~~d0S1£4~10 ~r ;~id'. togethl'r with interest thereon from date of payment of !laid sums at the rate of % of one percent p~r 
)6. R.liyer agrC'es that he will .not. com~it or ~uffe! to be comm~tl<·d any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
aai<l prenl!Sl'S, and that he will me.mtam s81d p1em1!\es m good cond1t10n. 
16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Ruyer to make 
S~fic~,8 ~~1 hi.~ ~~tfo8~·1;h~tt h:~:ntht;efoiT~ein~ha~ltebr~c:t'ivee ~~~e~~e~ithin ~ days thereafter, the 
A. Seller she.II hav(' the right, upon failure of the. Buye~ to remC'dy the default within five day\'! after written notice 
t~e~e ~~11!s~~c;~~::fo~~J ~~l~~i:i~~~t~:c1:bya~~e 1 H~~~~~Ys~~llc~~vt:rf~~~~dP{o0~h~t~e:i~: a11s11 1i~~ld':~~~s d:'~~;e;~~~ 
the non-perform_once of. the contract, and the Buyer ag_rees th_e.t the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
possession of sat? prem1,es without legal proce~ses as m it!\ first and_ former estate, toi;:-cther with all improve-
ments and addition~ made by the Buyer thereon, and the !aid additions and improvements shall remain with 
the land become the property of the Seller, the Buyer h,·cflm1ng at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
H. The Seller may bri~g suit and recover judgment for all d··lir.quent installmt>nt!, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this rl'll_ledy on one or. more occe.siflns shali not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereundn m the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller she.II have the right, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
t~\:n:: th~rR~;~; :~bj~~: ti~~e~~~ :nnJ~~~e~e=~di:~~<lj~et~~>!0t~r;~;e~f~!ec~~~r~~~~s i~ ~~~~:d"a~~0~i~~gt~e8 l~~e.~f 
f~~lu~Y:i~ ~Js~t!~d 8ant~o~~;;.:h;e~~o~~~t~hse01~efl~~ ~~=Y ph:~:e~sj~S:~~~t tfo~h:nf,e.J;fi~i!n~~ ~~h1c~8 ~~~.e r~~~~~: 
In the case of foreclosure, the Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
~~~f~[sP~~~;';f~~~ 0~nad r=~~il~e~ht: ::~~ ~s~h~si;~y~e~fi~f ~h~t~bfi~~tf~~ph~~~u~d~r ,c~l;eh~1~h~h~~~~3~1:s~~~~u~~~ 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entrr of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the uid premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. Jn the event there are a~y liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provide~ for or 
referred to, or in the event any hens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue age.inst the 
~~mteh;y.~c~~n~r tlie:nle~!n~~i~~~gS~l~~r,h~~!~nt~:r ~~y~hem:fo·o~~th~f :~~io!l~,c~e./a;~~n~i~~h~~~-~.~~~s s::de th;;~:tt~~i~hec~ead;~ 
~0e~~1;1~ 1~t:e5i~nf{~~~:ld at~/~u~~~d=d~~~~:\~:L•·f~.~:~~i/f the Buyt:r, be suspended until such time as such suspended 
19. The Seller on receiving the paynw1, ··rein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrE'C'S to execute and deliver to the Buyer ' 1,<si~ns, a good and sufficient warranty (k·~ i conveyin~ the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of a!: 'ucumbranees except as herein mentioned P:•<t x.:ept as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect _of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of · insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Sel1er, an .11.bstract brought to date at time of _.r at any time dur!ng the 
term of this u.~reement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It i!\ hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buy .. 1 accepts the said property 
in it:i present condition and that there are no rcprcsentatio11s, c:ovcnants, or agreemerit>. Let:.\o:<:n the parties he.reto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto 
---~.-~"~"~P~.IIB,., .. ",J"''D rs I,. C""'·r:n?I<P.J 
21. The Duyer and Seller f'ach agree that should th£'y default in any of the covenanh or agrccm.e"nts ·cant.11ri'ci..1 l.wre-
in, that ttie defaulting party shall pay all costs ancl expenses, includinv a reas_onaOle attorney's fee, w""'hich ""may Srise 
or 8ccruP from enforcing this ag'recment, or in oLt..aining possession of the premises covered herebr, or in pur.-;uinJ? any 
nmcdy pro\'i<lf'd hereunder or by the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. . . 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the snid parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
I Cirst above written. 
; Signed in the presence of 
'. >< 
/'-,; £->1 ',,-;) /',; f .,'/ 
Seller 
Ii 
'' /~:C;f!a ~j{~0, 
Buyer ~ 
I I . ~ r 
' 
> 
z 6 
" z ~ 
0. 0. 
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LEGAL DESC!H.t'T!ON 
The South1·r0~1t '-~unrter of the Southeast Quarter ,swt, 
SE}t) of Sectl0n 2tl, TMmsliin 40 South, RFJ.nge 13 
Wost, Salt Lake .Meri di nn, LESS .416 of an acre used 
for highw~y right of way. 
The Northwest Qunrter of the Northoast Quarter 
1NW~, l~H'r}) of Section 33, Townshtp 40 South, 
Range 13 West, Snl t Lake I.Jori di an, LESS • 1. 27tj 
of an ncre used for highway right of way. 
The Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter 
1S'!#,, SF4j And the Southeast Quarter of ·the 
Southwe3t; Gtc<artcr \SE-,}, S1.Yi-J of S0cti0n22, 
Townshin !10 S0uth, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Merid:l.sn tn Utah, snd .::ontaining Eighty \ tW / 
ncres of land less that portion of the Sfilt S~ 
used by the State for highway purposes. 
1 sic J 
The NEq- NEt of Section 27, Township 40 South; Rar..gs 
13 West, Salt LakB Base and Meridian in Utah aid 
containing Forty 140J acres more of less. 
Beginning at the North Quarter corner of Secti~n 27, 
Townshin lio South, Range 13 West, Sri.l t Lake Bairn 
and tforidir:rn in Utah; thence Sou th 2Ut:l feet; thenco 
West 420 feet, thence So1, th 375 feet; thence East 
420 feet; thenco Sou th 211+ feet; thence North 5ti 
deg. lt:l• West 363 feet; t~ence South 31 deg. 4t:l• 
West 411.o feet; thence Sou th 5t:l deg. ltj • East 554 
feet, more or less, to th~ Southeast corner of the 
N:&f NW{- of Section 27; thence West 1320 fe0t; thence 
North 132U feet; thence Eqst 1320 feet to placs of 
beginning, less that part of said property u.sed for 
3to_ to high\:g_y purposes. 
6, Beginni.nrr, at the North Quarter corner of Section 27, 
Township 40 Sou th, Rm {!,e 13 West, Salt Lake rlase 
and Vieridia n in Utqh, thence East 1320 feet; thence 
South 1320 fE>et; th once North 51 deg. 32• West lt:l7 
feet; thonce North 61 deg. 301 West 1110 feet; thence 
South 232 deg. 301 West 242.22 feet; thence North 
So dog. 2t:l 1 West 100 feet, more or less, to the 
westurly boundary line of said NW-~ Nfilt; thence 
North U25 feet, more or less, to the place of 
beginning; less that land used for highway purposes. 
7. 'l'he Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter 
\Sw+, HI~ 1 an<.1 the Northwest Quorter of the Southwest 
({nnrtc·r \llH-;r, SWt1 of Section Twenty-seven \27J, 
Town:,h1p l10 South, Rnnge 13 Wost, Salt Lake Bp.se 
and l1eddtr,n, LESS that pa.rt used for State Highway. 
-1-
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> 
Thst part of the N&J-, Swt, and SEt, ffi#,, Township 
40 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake J3a"" and Meridian, 
that lie.s \.Jest of Anderson• s Ranch to Hurricane, 
Utah road by way of Toquerville. 
With all improvements, apourtenancos and ori vileges 
and with the folloiiing water rjghts: Jl.oproximatoly 
3/5 of tho following water rigP. ts: Award No. 136 
to Anne. G. Anderson for 1.13 cfa of wqter and 
AwArd No. 136 A to Albert Anderson f0~" o.c:n cfs 
of water, both from Sand Hollow Creek, as aw~r'1ed 
by the general adjudication Decree of the Virgin 
River, entered 12 Dec. 1925, in the District Court 
of Washington County, Utah, in the case ent:l tled 
St. George and Washington Can'll Co. v. Hurricn no 
Canal Co. Also, oo shares of Ash Crook Water. 
-2-
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FOOTNOTES 
l/ See T 285-286. In essence Appellants accepted the 
P
roferredtestimony o~ Mr: KenthEsplin, an expert appraiser, 
and waived cross-examination ereon. 
This stipulation is reflected in Finding of Fact No. 12 
h'ch reflects that offsetting the mesne rents by the monies wl~eady paid under the contract by Appellants would still result 
~n the sum of $15, 728 being due Respondents and Cross-Appellants. ~ 260-61. The ~atter feel that this portion of their claim was 
arbitrarily denied. 
~I Defendants' Exhibits 15 and 93 are aerial photographs 
of the property, while the plat map marked Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
19 represents the Calls' total ownership in graphic form. 
ll Q [by Mr. Hughes] What was your husband [Mr. Stauffer] 
doing at the time that Mr. Call was giving you this information? 
A [by Mrs. Stauffer] He was sitting on the other 
side of me seeing that everything was as it should be. T 102:5-8. 
* * * * 
Q I see. So Mr. Call was solely responsible for 
dictating the terms of this agreement to you? 
A I only typed the agreement. 
Q But your testimony is that your husband didn't 
participate? 
A He participated with Mr. Call and placing these 
things down, seeing that they were what--that they were right. 
T 139: 8-14. 
* * * * 
Q [by Mr. Hughes] Now, you stated that when you 
typed up this agreement, your husband was sitting somewhere and 
that Mr. Call was dictating the terms to you, is that correct? 
A [by Mrs. Stauffer] 
beside me. 
Yes. They were both sitting 
Q Isn't it true that your husband and Mr. Call 
penciled down on paper to get together what they thought the 
contract should state? 
A They might have. T 140:16-23. 
* * * * 
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Q [by Mr. Hughes] Now, calling your attention 
again to January 2d, 1969, it's true that.your wife typed up 
this Uniform Real Estate Contract, isn't it, Mr. Stauffer? 
A [by Mr. Stauffer] Yes. 
Q And isn't it true that both you and Mr. Call tO:: 
her what to put in that contract, that you two sat together ani 
discussed it and told your wife what to put in? 
A Part of it, yes. 
Q If I stated that you sat around the table and 
that you and Mr. Call told her to put--what to put in the contr: 
would you state that was true? 
A Yes. 
Q And so it wasn't just Mr. Call that stated what'. 
put in the contract, was it; you participated in that, didn'tic 
A Yes. 
Q You were aware, weren't you, that these legal 
descriptions, which Mr. Call had on January 2d, 1969, wouldn't 
aid you in defining the internal boundaries of the property, 
weren't you? 
A I think so. 
THE COURT: What's your answer? 
THE WITNESS: I think so, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. In other words, you undm! 
that those descriptions were just a general description of all: 
the property involved that he owned? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that whatever it was you were buyi: 
would not be defined by the general description attached thereti 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. T 64:14-65:14. 
Mr. Call flatly stated the conveyancing language was 
supplied by Appellants. T 232:18-21. 
f±:.1 He reinforced this testimony on cross examination. 
T 273:12-274:6. 
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~/ The Court finds that Russell Call made several trips 
Utah each year between January 2, 1969, and the filing of 
t~. lawsuit in March of 1973, and that on several occassions ~ 1~daries were discussed but no subsequent agreement, oral 0~uotherwise, was ever reached that resolved the ambiguities. 
finding No. 7 . 
~/ The Court finds that the property description on the 
"Uniform Real Estate Contract", Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17, 
·s lacking in that it does not describe with particularity ~ny discernible tract of land, and said description is incapable 
of being defined or surveyed with certainty. Finding No. 4. 
See also T 277: 8-13. 
II The Court concludes that the document dated January 2, 
1969, bearing the title "Uniform Real Estate Contract," Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 17, is of no effect as a contract for the sale of land 
due to the insufficiency of the property description thereon and 
that the document is not specifically enforceable for that reason. 
Conclusion No. 1. 
~/ The Court further concludes that the document dated 
January 2, 1969, bearing the title "Uniform Real Estate Contract", 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17, was treated by and between the parties 
as an agreement to agree on boundaries in the future and as such 
is unenforceable. Conclusion No. 2. 
~/ The Court concludes that as Plaintiffs have waived 
their second cause of action which sought general and punitive 
damages, alleging substantial improvements made on the land and 
Defendants' unlawful, wrongful, and malicious refusal to perform 
the terms of said "Uniform Real Estate Contract", Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 17, that said second cause of action is dismissed 
with prejudice. Conclusion No. 5. See Finding No. 5 and 
T 280: 10-26. -
10/ The Court further concludes that Plaintiffs David M. 
Stauffer and Connie A. Stauffer are entitled to recover for all 
amounts paid to Defendants Russell Call and Velma Call pursuant 
to the monetary terms of the "Uniform Real Estate Contract", 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 17, dated January 2, 1969, with interest 
thereon at the legal rate, the total amount of principal paid 
~o Defendants Call being $6, 400. 00 and interest at 6 percent 
rom da~e of payment totalling $2, 828. 00, for a total amount d$~e 2 P2 laintiffs David M. Stauffer and Connie A. Stauffer of 
• 8.00 as of September 1, 1977. Conclusion No. 8. 
ll/ F. d ~ in ing No. 12; Conclusion No. 6. It is curious to 
note that Appellants' counterclaim for rents was allowed by 
court order in February 1976. R 50. Thereafter interrogatories 
~~~arding improvements and area occupied which concerned the rents, 
entry on the land by Appellants' appraiser was accomplished 
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primarily through discovery and the use of ~anctions. R 55. 56, 61-63, 70-74, 105. Conversely, the affirmative defens 
under Rule 8 ( c) , U. R. C. P. , of laches was raised in an amen~ d 
reply filed five days prior to trial, and four and one-halfe 
years after the filing of the complaint. T 2: 18-23; R a 
R 219-20 (,6). It is incongrous at best that the affirm~tiv 
defense of laches pled three working days prior to trial bee 
allowed, the court stating that the counterclaim defeated 
having been filed a year and one-half before, was untimely 
Conclusion No. 6. · 
§224. Conveyance of unlocated portion of tract. 
The effect of a deed purporting to convey a stated number 
of unlocated acres of a larger tract is determined by the 
intention of the parties as shown by the language of the deed 
construed in the light of the rule that a deed should be held 
to pass some interest if such effect may be given to it con· 
sistent with the law and the terms of the instrument. Where 
it does not appear to be contrary to the true intent of the 
deed, a deed purporting to convey a stated acreage or other 
designated quantity of land of a larger tract, without attempt 
to locate and describe a particular piece as that conveyed, 
operates as a conveyance of an undivided interest in the larger 
tract. This is clearly the case where the deed refers to the 
specif iced quantity of land being conveyed out of the larger 
tract as "undivided" or "lying in comm.on." 
If, however, a conveyance is intended to transfer a 
particular part of a tract or lot, it must contain a sufficient 
description to make the boundaries of the part intended to be 
conveyed ascertainable. A deed which purports to convey a 
specific part of a tract but does not attempt definitely to 
located the part, referring to it merely as so many acres or 
other indicated quantity of the the larger tract, is ineffectiv1 
as a legal conveyance. Thus, even if the whole tract or lot ii 
in form a parallelogram, the description will usually be i~suf· 
ficient unless the area of the land conveyed and its location 
in relation to the larger tract are stated. A description 
merely as a part of a certain named parcel, giving only two 
straight lines and nothing more by which the land embraced can 
be determined, is not sufficient. The same ruling has been 
made with regard to the uncertainty of the description of a 
quantity of land to be taken from a lot or tract with n~ other 
description than that it shall lie on both sides of a highway 
However, a conveyance of a specified number of acres designate~ 
as being located at a given corner of a designated lot or trac 
is sufficient to sustain the deed, which will be construed a~n 
conveying a tract containing the designated number of acr~~e~ 
in a square form. Also, where a tract out of which a sma nt 
tract is conveyed is inclosed by parallel lines and the gr\ 
is of a stated area in a specified corner thereof, the cour 
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.11 onstrue the intention of the grantor to be that the land wi tcd shall be bounded by parallel lines, thus enabling a gr~~l=d person to plat the severed portion, and the description s~t 1 be held sufficient. Similarly, it is sufficient to specify 
wid'stance from the intersection of one street with another and 
: d~stance along the latter to its intersection with the former. 
Where greater strictness is required in the description of 
tax deed or a deed conveying land levied on and sold by virtue 
af attachment or execution than is required in conveyances inter 0 
artes such deeds which merely describe the property conveyed ~s a p;rtion of a designated tract, without any greater certainty 
as to the identity of the particular part conveyed, are deemed inef-
fectual and void for uncertainty. 
§225. Grantee's right of selection. 
A common-law canon of construction under which, to overcome 
uncertainty as to the land conveyed, the grantee is allowed to 
select the land conveyed but not located, has been applied in a 
number of cases, especially those decided at a comparatively 
early time. Pending the exercise of such right, the deed operates 
to convey an undivided interest, conferring on the grantee and 
his successors in interest the right of destroying the cotenancy 
by exercise of the right of selection. Where, however, the instru-
ment shows that it was the intention not to pass title as an 
immediate effect of the contract until the grantee selected the 
designated number of acres from a tract, the grantee takes no 
title to any part of the land before selection and does not 
receive an undivided interest. Furthermore, there is no right 
of selection where the grantor manifests an intention to convey 
only an undivided interest, the deed in such case operating to 
create a con tenancy subject to the usual conditions applicable 
to that form of tenure. 
It has been held that an effective selection is made when 
the person having the right of selection executes a subsequent 
deed describing by metes and bounds the area so selected. 
Where the deed purports to convey a single tract owned by 
the grantor at a designated place and he owns several tracts 
thfere, the grantee does not have the right of electing which 
o several tracts he will take. 
23 Am.Jur.2d ~ §§224-225 (1965). 
13/ . 
f ~ While the Jackson case is inapposite here, the burden ~ proof re9uisite to sever recognized tenancies in common may 
5e greater in Utah in 1978 that that applied in New York in 1831. ~t ~. Heiselt v. Heiselt, 10 Utah 2d 126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960); ~ wortny v. Clyde, 1 Utah 2d 251, 265 P. 2d 420 (1954); and 
erryv. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P.2d 542 (1948). 
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14 / It was also found that Appellants had received r • 
from third parties in the sum of $4, 000. Finding No. 5. ~;' 
court also failed to reduce the amount allegedly due Appell . 
by this amount, thus allowing them both the return of moni/r.: 
under the contract and rents from third parties on lands ne~··· 
legally transferred to them. This is clearly an untenable r:1 
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